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Abstract
This research advances the hypothesis that reversal of fortunes in the process of economic develop-
ment can be traced to the e¤ect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of cooperation
in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment enhanced
the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that could
mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the benecial
e¤ects of cooperation on the intensive margin of agriculture, low land productivity countries
lagged behind during the agricultural stage of development. However, as cooperation, and
its persistent e¤ect on social capital, have become increasingly important in the process of
industrialization, the transition from agriculture to industry among unfavorable land endowment
economies was expedited, permitting those economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage
of development, to overtake the high land productivity economies in the industrial stage of
development. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across countries
the research further explores the testable predictions of the theory. It establishes that: (i)
reversal of fortunes in the process of development can be traced to variation in natural land
productivity across countries. Economies characterized by favorable land endowment dominated
the world economy in the agricultural stage of development but were overtaken in the process
of industrialization; (ii) lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with higher
levels of contemporary social capital; (iii) cooperation, as reected by agricultural infrastructure,
emerged primarily in places were land was not highly productive and collective action could have
diminished the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance agricultural output.
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Industrialization
JEL Classication Numbers: O11, O13, O14, O31, O33, O41, O50
I am grateful to Quamrul Ashraf, Raouf Boucekkine, Mario Carillo, David Cuberes, Carl-Johan Dalgaard, David
De La Croix, Pierre Dehez, Frederic Docquier, Boris Gershman, Veronique Gille, Lothar Grall, Andreas Irmen, Marc
Klemp, Omar Licandro, Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, Pierre Picard, Patrick Pintus, Louis Putterman, Ken Tabata, Wessel
Vermeulen, David Weil and especially to Oded Galor for valuable comments. I would also like to thank the participants
at the AMSE workshop in growth and development, 8th BETA-Workshop in Historical Economics, Brown macro
seminar, Conference on "Intergenerational Transmission of Entrepreneurship, Occupations and Cultural Traits in the
Process of Long-run Economic Growth", CREA seminar series, IRES seminar series, Royal Economic Society conference
and the University of Porto seminar for their helpful comments and suggestions.
yUniversity of Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, 162a, Avenue de la Faiencerie, L - 1511
Luxembourg (e-mail: anastasia.litina@uni.lu)
1 Introduction
The origins of the remarkable transformation of the world income distribution in the past two
centuries have been the focus of an intense debate in recent years. The long shadow of history on
comparative economic development has been established empirically, underlying the role of variations
in historical and pre-historical bio-geographical conditions, as well as the persistent e¤ects of cultural,
institutional, and human capital characteristics, in the vast inequality across the globe.
This research advances the hypothesis that a reversal of fortune in the process of economic
development can be traced to the e¤ect of natural land productivity on the desirable level of
cooperation in the agricultural sector. In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment
enhanced the economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that
could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the benecial
e¤ects of cooperation on the intensive margin of agriculture, low land productivity countries lagged
behind during the agricultural stage of development. However, as cooperation, and its persistent
e¤ect on social capital, have become increasingly important in the process of industrialization, the
transition from agriculture to industry among unfavorable land endowment economies was expedited,
permitting those economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage of development, to overtake
the high land productivity economies in the industrial stage of development.
The fundamental hypothesis of this research originates from the realization that the evolution
of the wealth of nations has been driven in part by the trade-o¤ between land productivity and the
associated level of cooperation and social capital, in di¤erent stages of development. Social capital
emerged initially as the outcome of cooperation in the agricultural sector in an e¤ort to further
enhance natural land productivity. However, cooperation in the agricultural sector was not only
essential for the development of agricultural infrastructure per se. Importantly, it contributed to
the emergence of social capital that has complemented the industrial sector and thus accelerated the
transition from agriculture to industry.
This research suggests, therefore, that some of the observed di¤erences in the patterns of
economic development across the globe can be traced to variations in the level of cooperation and
social capital, originating from di¤erences in natural land endowment. Places with favorable natural
land productivity had a reduced incentive to cooperate in the development of agricultural infrastruc-
ture. While their favorable land endowment permitted their domination during the agricultural era,
their lower incentive for cooperation resulted in a lower level of social capital which was crucial for
the development of the industrial sector. Consequently, lacking some of the necessary elements for
the emergence of industrialization, they were overtaken in the transition to the industrialization era.
Correspondingly, poorly endowed countries cooperated more intensely in the creation of agricultural
infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of low natural land productivity. Nevertheless,
despite the enhancement in their agricultural productivity, they lagged behind during the agricultural
stage of development due to unfavorable land endowment. The intense cooperation though, generated
a higher level of social capital, which ultimately allowed faster industrialization and overtaking of
the high land productivity economies in the industrial stage of development.
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The theory is based on an underlying mechanism consisting of ve intermediate elements
that account for the di¤erential development of economies and their asymmetric transition from an
epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a regime of sustained economic growth.
The rst element suggests that less productive places had more incentives to develop agri-
cultural infrastructure, that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Resources
allocated to the development of agricultural infrastructure enhanced productivity indirectly, but came
on the account of direct agricultural production. Hence, the opportunity cost of the construction
of agricultural infrastructure was higher in more productive places and therefore investment in
infrastructure was more benecial in places with unfavorable land endowment.
The second element of the mechanism establishes that the development of public agricultural
infrastructure generated an incentive for cooperation. Since agricultural infrastructure is primarily
a public good, collective action is essential for its optimal provision, in light of the incentive of
individuals to minimize the allocation of their private resources to the production of public goods.
Moreover, since collective action is conducive for cooperation, places with lower natural land pro-
ductivity generated higher incentives for cooperation.
Traditional forms of agricultural infrastructure include, among others, irrigation systems,
storage facilities and drainage systems. In Egypt, as early as 4000 years ago, surface irrigation was
used, exploiting the annual ooding of the Nile (Adams, 1965; Butzer, 1976). Surface irrigation was
also exploited in Mesopotamia and China, and canals were built to funnel larger volumes of water
to more distant elds. Finally in Western Europe, the rst large-scale irrigation was developed by
the Romans, who built aqueducts to channel water from the mountains exploiting gravity as well as
reservoirs to store the channelled water.
Other forms of agricultural infrastructure to enhance land productivity, included drainage
and storage technologies. Ancient civilizations like the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Chinese
developed drainage systems, technologies that were further advanced by the Romans. In England,
land drainage was initiated in the tenth century, in an attempt to re-claim areas adjoining the North
Sea. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the vast majority of available land had already
been reclaimed by surface draining of lakes, marshes and fens. In addition, draining and diking was
inaugurated by the Dutch in the 16th century to increase the fraction of arable land. Similarly,
drainage in the United States took place primarily within two developmental periods, during 1870-
1920 and 1945-1960, in an attempt to enlarge the fraction of land capable of agricultural production.1
Storage technologies were also widespread. Prior to industrialization in England, the cost of
storage was overwhelming from the viewpoint of individual farmers (McCloskey and Nash, 1984). To
mitigate the risk associated with agricultural production, collective action, either in the form of risk
sharing or by developing communal facilities, was often adopted (Stead, 2004). Similarly, storage
facilities were developed at the community level in Sweden in an attempt to cope with adverse
climatic conditions, and had a signicant e¤ect on grain banks (magasins) during 18th and 19th
century (Berg, 2007).
1Overall, an estimated region of 110 million acres of agricultural land in the United States, is claimed to have
beneted from articial drainage as of 1985. At least 70 percent of this drained land is allocated to crops, 12 percent
to pasture, 16 percent to woodland, and 2 percent in miscellaneous uses.
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Importantly, all major forms of agricultural infrastructure were associated with large-scale
cooperation at the community or at the state level, and particularly in early societies, collective action
and broad participation was required to undertake and construct the necessary infrastructure.2
The third element of the mechanism advances the hypothesis that the emergence of social
capital can be traced to the level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, in the creation of
infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Indeed, according
to the Social Structural Approach, di¤erences in the manifestation of social capital are driven by
the social interactions in which individuals are involved (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Similarly, the
emergence and prevalence of norms that facilitate fruitful interaction (such as norms of mutual trust)
can be traced to the need for large-scale cooperation (Henrich et al., 2001).3 Relatedly, Putnam
(2000) suggests that social capital is primarily embedded in networks of reciprocal social relations.4
The fourth element of the mechanism suggests that social capital has persisted over time via
di¤erent transmission mechanisms. Evolutionary theories, advance the "social learning" hypothesis,
according to which norms and cultural traits that survive and are transmitted across generations are
the ones that contribute to individual and group survival (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1995; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981). The cultural transmission hypothesis suggests that preferences, beliefs
and norms are intergenerationally transmitted via socialization processes, such as social imitation
and learning (Bisin and Verdier, 2001).5 Finally, political institutions are argued to have a crucial
role in the transmission of social capital across generations (Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008).6
The fth element of the mechanism suggests that social capital is more complementary
to the industrial sector.7 It is designed to capture the importance of social capital in promoting
2Natural experiments that took place in recent years in developing countries, found evidence that after the
development of irrigation infrastructure, the average yearly production for a bad year exceeded the average yearly
production of a good year prior to the usage of irrigation ( Bardhan (2000) for communities in rural India, Upho¤ and
Wijayaratna (2000) for Sri-Lanka, and Ostrom (2000) for Nepal). In all cases, large scale cooperation at the community
level was developed, thereby strengthening the communal ties.
3 In the context of a cross-cultural study, Henrich et al. (2001) conducted ultimatum, public good, and dictator
game experiments, with subjects from fteen small-scale societies, exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural
conditions. They nd that, in societies where the payo¤ from extra-familial cooperation in economic activity is higher,
subjects display signicantly higher levels of cooperation in the experimental games.
4Putnam et al. (1993) in their inuential study about social capital, studied the cases of Northern and Southern
Italy. They argue that in Northern Italy, where the structure of the society was more civic, a higher level of social
capital was obtained, ultimately leading to higher economic prosperity. Regions in Southern Italy were faced with a
more hierarchical structure which resulted in underdevelopment of social capital that eventually led to inferior economic
outcomes.
5There are di¤erent mechanisms through which social capital can be intergenerationally transmitted, such as
imitation or deliberate inculcation by parents. The empirical literature documents a strong correlation in the propensity
to trust between parents and children (Katz and Rotter, 1969; Dohmen et al., 2011). The persistence of trust between
second-generation immigrants and current inhabitants of the country of origin, has also been explored in the literature
(Borjas, 1992; Uslaner, 2002; Guiso et al., 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2010).
6Tabellini (2008) advances the hypothesis that regions that had developed better institution and imposed more
checks and balances on the executive experience higher levels of trust in contemporary societies. Guiso et al. (2008)
attribute current di¤erences in social capital between the Northern and the Southern regions of Italy to the fact that
the Northern regions developed free city-states in the Middle Ages, as opposed to the hierarchical structures that were
developed in the South. Thus they conclude that at least 50% of the North- South gap in social capital is due to
the lack of a free city state experience in the South. Nunn and Wantchekon (2010) trace the origins of mistrust in
contemporary Africa to the impact of the transatlantic slave trade.
7This supposition can be conrmed empirically by regressing, in a cross section of countries, current economic
outcomes, captured by per capita GDP in the year 2000, on trust, the share of employment in agriculture and their
interactive term. The outcome of this regression shows that trust is positively a¤ecting economic outcomes, the size
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socioeconomic transitions to an industrialized regime. Evidence suggests, that economic activities
such as commercial transactions, entrepreneurship, innovation, accumulation of human capital, credit
markets and enforcement of contracts, all of which are building blocks of the industrial sector, are
further enhanced and boosted in societies with high levels of social capital and trust.8
The proposed mechanism is aimed to identify the intermediate elements that can account
for the e¤ect of natural land endowment on the evolution of economies, and their transition from
agriculture to industry. What can be viewed initially as a drawback in economic development, namely
the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable land endowment on agricultural production, triggers a process that
can ultimately lead to a reversal of fortune with respect to economic outcomes. Low land productivity
countries had an incentive to cooperate more intensely in the creation of agricultural infrastructure
and the outcome of this e¤ort, may have been initially insu¢ cient to allow them to achieve better
economic outcomes compared to highly productive places. Nevertheless, it generated a level of social
capital that was su¢ ciently high to accelerate the transition to industrialization.
At early stages of development, the economy is in a Malthusian regime where output is
generated entirely by an agricultural sector that is subject to decreasing returns to labor. Aggregate
productivity in the agricultural sector, is partly determined by the natural land productivity, and
can be further enhanced by agricultural infrastructure. A fraction of the labor employed in the
agricultural sector is allocated to the production of the private good, whereas the remaining fraction
is allocated to the production of agricultural infrastructure. Technological progress in the agricultural
sector is a gradual process fuelled by knowledge creation, which is positively a¤ected by the size of the
workforce in the agricultural sector. Resources generated by technological progress are channeled
primarily towards an increase in population size, and the economy evolves towards a Malthusian
equilibrium where income per capita remains stagnant along a dynamic path characterized by growing
population and total factor productivity.
The transition from agriculture to industry in the process of development, is driven by sus-
tained growth in the latent productivity of the industrial sector. The indirect e¤ect of cooperation on
the industrial sector, through the accumulation of social capital, drives growth in the latent industrial
productivity, which ultimately leads to the transition to industry in later stages of development.
Once the industrial technology is adopted, the economy emerges into a Post-Malthusian regime of
development, where the economy operates in both the agricultural and the industrial sector. The
endogenous growth of total factor productivity in the industrial sector, along with intersectoral labor
mobility, generates a dynamic path characterized by endogenously growing population and income
per capita.
of the agricultural sector is negatively associated with current economic outcomes, and importantly the interactive
term has a negative coe¢ cient. Hence, reassuringly, as implied by the negative coe¢ cient of the interactive term, the
positive e¤ect of trust on current economic outcomes is diminishing with the size of the agricultural sector, thereby
implying that trust is more complementary in enhancing economic activity in more industrialized societies.
8As Arrow (1972) put it: "Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly
any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness
in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual condence". Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that trust and civic
cooperation are associated with stronger economic performance (better enforcement of contracts, innovation, credit
markets, human capital accumulation). Putnam (2000) advances the hypothesis that networks of mutual obligation
may encourage entrepreneurship, whereas Greif (1993) provides evidence that large networks make it more likely for a
potential entrepreneur to mobilize resources to start a new enterprise and nd the necessary suppliers, customers, and
employees.
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The interaction between natural land productivity, cooperation, social capital and the process
of development is examined based on the signicance of their coevolution in the agricultural stage of
development and also in the timing of the take-o¤ from agriculture to industry. In the agricultural
stage, an economy characterized by a relatively higher degree of cooperation in the development of
agricultural infrastructure, aimed to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of low land productivity, is associated
with a relatively inferior Malthusian steady state in terms of the economys level of productivity per
worker and the size of its working population. This inferiority, stems from the fact that the adverse
e¤ect of unfavorable land endowment is signicant in the context of an economy that operates only
in the agricultural sector, and therefore natural land endowments are crucial for agricultural output.
The resulting level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as triggered by natural land
productivity, has also an e¤ect on the timing of industrialization and, thus, on the take-o¤ to a
state of sustained economic growth. The earlier take-o¤ from the Malthusian steady state by a
society with an unfavorable natural land endowment, stems from the fact that the benecial e¤ect
of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as perceived by the e¤ect of the emerging social capital on
the advancement of knowledge, and therefore on the advancement of industrial productivity relative
to that in agriculture, outweighs the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable land endowment on agricultural
production.
A high level of social capital within societies, is thus associated with the phenomenon of
overtaking in global economic development. Unfavorable land endowment, that generates intense
cooperation in the agricultural sector, and eventually a higher level of social capital, may generate
an inferior outcome in the agricultural stage of development, but it ultimately stimulates an earlier
industrialization and, thus, an earlier take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth. As such,
natural land productivity in agricultural societies can have a profound e¤ect on their historical
experience with regard to the process of economic development.
Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land suitability for agriculture across countries,
the research further explores the testable predictions of the theory: (i) a reversal of fortune in the
process of development can be traced to variation in land suitability across countries. Economies
characterized by favorable land endowment dominated the world economy in the agricultural stage of
development but were overtaken in the process of industrialization, (ii) lower level of land suitability
in the past is associated with higher levels of contemporary social capital, and (iii) cooperation,
as reected by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places were land was not highly
productive and collective action could diminish the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance
agricultural output.
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis rst establishes that a
reversal of fortune in the process of economic development can be traced to the e¤ect of land
endowment on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. The examination of
comparative development at the agricultural stage of development employs a Malthusian perspective,
thereby assuming that technologically advanced economies had a larger rather than richer population
(Ashraf and Galor, 2011). Hence, as a proxy for prosperity in the agricultural stage of development,
the research employs historical data on population density as opposed to income per capita and
examines the hypothesized e¤ect of land suitability on population densities in the years 1, 1000 and
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1500. Land suitability is proxied by an index of the average suitability of land for cultivation, based
on geospatial data on various ecological factors including (i) growing degree days, (ii) the ratio of
potential to actual evapotranspiration, (iii) soil carbon density, and (iv) soil pH.9
The historical analysis reveals a negative relationship between log land suitability and log
population density in the year 1500. In particular, accounting for a number of geographical charac-
teristics that could potentially a¤ect population density in the year 1500, namely the timing of the
Neolithic revolution, distance from technological frontier in the year 1500, as well as geographical
characteristics, the estimated linear coe¢ cient associated with log land suitability implies that a 1%
increase in land suitability would increase population density by 0.43%.
To establish a reversal of fortunewith respect to natural land endowments, the analysis
employs cross country variation in land suitability, to explain the cross-country variation in log income
per capita in the year 2000. A number of potentially confounding factors and alternative hypothesis
suggested by the related literature on comparative development are accounted for. The geography
channel is controlled through a number of geographical controls that may a¤ect economic outcomes
today. The institutional hypothesis that suggests that a "reversal of fortune" can be traced to the
impact of European colonization on comparative development, is accounted for through a number
of controls including European colonies dummies, legal origins dummies and institutional quality
controls. Furthermore, controls for the disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and religion
shares are employed.
Importantly, as suggested by the theory, it is not the direct e¤ect of land suitability that
drives the reversal of fortune but instead the portable component associated with land suitability,
namely the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation. In the absence of migration,
the countrys level of social capital is captured by its natural land endowment. However, in the
post-colonial era, where mass migration has taken place, the level of social capital in each country
reects the weighted average of land suitability among its ancestral population. Hence, in order
to capture this distinction, two alternative empirical strategies are adopted. First, the sample is
restricted to countries with a large percentage of native population, thereby implying that the social
capital that has been accumulated in the past, is still a prevalent norm among the native population.
Second, the measure of land suitability is adjusted to capture the portable component of natural land
endowment, namely social capital, using the weighted average of the land suitability of the ancestral
population of each country today.
The results from the contemporary analysis reveal a positive relationship between log adjusted
land suitability and log income per capita in the year 2000. Once geographical, institutional and
cultural factors are accounted for, it is shown that a 1% increase in adjusted land suitability can
account for a 0.26% decrease in income per capita. Reassuringly, the highly signicant and negative
e¤ect of land suitability on income per capita, persists when the analysis is conducted using the
original measure of land suitability while restricting the sample for countries with native population
higher than 75%. In the restricted sample it is shown that a 1% increase in land suitability can
account for a 0.21% decrease in income per capita.
9The index is based on geospatial soil pH and temperature data, as reported by Ramankutty et al. (2002) and
aggregated to the country level by Michalopoulos (2011). The average of land quality is thus the average value of the
index across the grid cells within a country.
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Second, reassuringly, the empirical analysis establishes that the reversal of fortune captures
the adverse e¤ect of natural land productivity on social capital as reected by the contemporary
level of generalized trust. Importantly, since the portable component associated with land suitability,
namely the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation, a¤ects the current level of
trust, the measure of land suitability is adjusted to capture the portable component of natural land
endowment, namely social capital, using the weighted average of the land suitability of the ancestral
population of each country today. In particular, adjusted land suitability has a highly signicant
positive e¤ect on the current level of trust, controlling for geographical and institutional factors,
ethnic fractionalization, disease environment and dummies for continents, colonial and legal origins
and major religion shares. Reassuringly, similar results are obtained if an alternative measure of
social capital is employed, namely the extent of participation in civic activities (La Porta et al.,
1997). Furthermore, the qualitative results remain intact if as an additional robustness check, the
unadjusted measure of land suitability is employed and the sample of countries is restricted to those
with native population larger than 75%.
Third, the empirical analysis establishes that higher suitability of land for agriculture is
associated with a lower level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as reected by the fraction of
irrigated land. In the absence of extensive cross-country data on irrigation prior to industrialization,
the analysis is based on the fraction of irrigated land for a sample of non-industrial countries in the
year 1900. Consistently with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis reveals a statistically
signicant and robust negative e¤ect of the log land suitability on the fraction of irrigated land in
the year 1900. In particular a 1% increase in land suitability is associated with a 0.48% decrease in
the fraction of irrigated land.
The adverse e¤ect of natural land productivity on cooperation in earlier periods is examined
based on several proxies of cooperation: a) communication in the year 1 CE, b) transportation in
the year 1 CE, and c) medium of exchange in the year 1 CE.10 According to the theory, sophisti-
cated means of communication, transportation and medium of exchange have been catalysts in the
advancement of large-scale cooperation, and thus, under-development of these technologies reects
the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the extent of cooperation. Nevertheless, it could be plausibly
argued that the advancement of these technologies captures the degree of trade, associated with
higher land suitability, as opposed to the emergence of cooperation in an environment characterized
by lower land suitability. Reassuringly however, a more suitable land for agriculture in these societies
had an adverse e¤ect on the technological levels of these three sectors, suggesting that the dominating
e¤ect was indeed that of reduced cooperation. Moreover, the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on
the development of these technologies remains signicant if the degree of inequality in the suitability
of land for agriculture a more direct proxy for the trade channel in early stages of development
10The development of each of each these three sectors is measured on a 3-point scale. In the communications
sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence of both true writing and mnemonic or non-written
records, a value of 1 under the presence of only mnemonic or non-written records, and a value of 2 under the
presence of both. In the transportation sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence of both
vehicles and pack or draft animals, a value of 1 under the presence of only pack or draft animals, and a value
of 2 under the presence of both. In the medium of exchange, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the
absence of domestically used articles and currency, a value of 1 under the presence of only domestically used
articles and the value of 2 under the presence of both.
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 is accounted for. As expected, the evidence suggests that indeed societies characterized by a
higher degree of inequality in the suitability of land for agriculture, and therefore societies that
had an increased incentive to trade, developed more advanced communication and transportation
technologies as well as more sophisticated mediums of exchange. Nevertheless, low land suitability has
still a signicant positive e¤ect on cooperation, as reected by the development of these technologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature.
Section 3 develops a formal theoretical model that generates the main hypotheses. Section 4 presents
empirical ndings consistent with the proposed hypotheses. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Advances with Respect to the Related Literature
This research contributes to the literature that explore of the origins of comparative development,
reversal of fortune, and social capital.
First, the research sheds new light on the origins of the contemporary di¤erences in income
per capita across the globe. Various theories of comparative development have been advanced in the
literature. The role of geography, institutions, colonialism, culture, human capital, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and genetic diversity has been at the center of research attempting to account for
di¤erential development patterns across the globe.
The geographical hypothesis suggests that environmental conditions a¤ected economic perfor-
mance directly, through their e¤ect on health, work e¤ort, and agricultural productivity (Huntington,
1915; Myrdal, 1968; Jones, 1981; Landes, 1998; Sachs and Malaney, 2002). Moreover, the indirect
e¤ect of geography, has been underlined by Diamond (1997) who has established the geographical
determinants of the timing of the Neolithic revolution and their persistent e¤ect on comparative
development.11
The role of institutions in fostering economic growth have been advanced by North and
Thomas (1973), Mokyr (1990), and Greif (1993), and has been empirically established by Hall and
Jones (1999), La Porta et al. (1999), Rodrik et al. (2004), and Acemoglu et al. (2005). In addition,
initial geographical conditions and their association with inequality gave rise to persistent di¤erences
in institutional quality across regions (Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Galor
et al., 2009).
The cultural hypothesis, as advanced by Weber (1905, 1922) and Landes (1998, 2006) pro-
poses, that norms and ethics that enhanced entrepreneurial spirit and thus innovation brought
about a rapid transition at industrial stages of development. The adverse e¤ect of ethnolinguistic
fractionalization on economic development has been examined by Easterly and Levine (1997) and
Alesina et al. (2003), and the hump-shaped e¤ect of genetic diversity on economic outcomes, reecting
the trade-o¤between the benecial and the detrimental e¤ects of diversity on productivity, is explored
in Ashraf and Galor (2011b).
Finally, the role of human capital formation has been advanced as an alternative hypothesis,
according to which the technologically driven demand for human capital, during the second phase of
industrialization, led to an expansion in investment in human capital, which in turn led to an even
11This channel is examined empirically by Olsson and Hibbs (2005) and (Ashraf and Galor, 2011a).
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more rapid increase in technological progress and accelerated the transition to a regime of sustained
growth (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Lucas, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004; Galor, 2011).
This research, in contrast, identies a novel mechanism through geographical characteristics
a¤ect contemporary economic outcomes, underlining the role of unfavorable land endowment in the
emergence of cooperation, and thus social capital, and its persistent e¤ect on comparative economic
development.
Second, the research provides an alternative theory for the reversal of fortune in the per-
formance of economies in the process of development. Existing theories propose three alternative
hypotheses for the reversal of fortune. According to the "temperate drift hypothesis", while ge-
ographical conditions favored the tropics in early stags of development, agricultural technologies
had higher complementarity with geographical conditions in temperate areas, generating a reversal
in economic outcomes in the long-run (Bloch, 1966; Mokyr, 1990). Attentively, Acemoglu et al.
(2005) have argued that the imposition of extractive institutions by European colonizers in relatively
a­ uent regions during the pre-industrial era brought about the reversal in the relative performance
in the long-run. Finally, Ashraf and Galor (2011c), establish that societies that were geographically
isolated, and thus culturally homogeneous, operated more e¢ ciently in the agricultural stage of
development, but their lack of cultural diversity reduced their adaptability and thus delayed their
industrialization.
The proposed theory, in contrast, suggests that a reversal of fortune can be traced to the
benecial e¤ect of natural land productivity on economic outcomes in the agricultural stage of
development, and its detrimental e¤ect on the level of cooperation and social capital and therefore
on the pace of industrialization in the long-run.12
Third, the research contributes to the understanding of the emergence of social capital in
the process of development. Existing studies suggest that cooperation and sociopolitical networks
gave rise to social capital (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Henrich et al., 2001). This research extends
the argument and suggests that indeed the origins of social capital can be traced to large-scale
cooperation, which however emerged as early as thousands of year ago, coinciding with the emergence
of agriculture and the need of the community to cooperate for the development of agricultural
infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment.13
12 Interestingly, this result is applicable to a broad set of countries, thereby capturing reversals within the European
continent or the overtaking of Asia by Europe in the transition to industrialization (Landes, 1998), as opposed to the
institutional hypothesis that is relevant for colonized counties.
13The geographic origins of trust have been explored earlier by Durante (2010). Unlike the proposed mechanism that
focuses on the e¤ect of unfavorable natural land productivity on cooperation in the construction of physical agricultural
infrastructure, Durante explores the role of climatic variability and thus the insurance motive in the emergence of
trust. Moreover, in contrast to Durante who establishes empirically the reduced form relationship between climatic
variability in the past and contemporary level of trust, the current paper establishes empirically the channel through
which unfavorable land productivity a¤ected the contemporary level of trust, establishing its intermediate e¤ect on
cooperation in the agricultural stage of development. Furthermore, unlike the focus of Durante on the origins of trust,
the current research main focus is on comparative development and reversal of fortune, where the geographical origins
of trust is only an intermediary mechanism for the hypothesis as a whole.
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3 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider a perfectly competitive overlapping-generations economy in the process of development
where economic activity extends over innite discrete time.
3.1 Production
In every period, a single homogenous good is being produced either in an agricultural sector or
in both an agricultural and an industrial sector. In early stages of development, the economy
operates exclusively in the agricultural sector, whereas the industrial sector is not economically
viable. However, since productivity grows faster in the industrial sector, it ultimately becomes
economically viable and therefore, in later stages of development, the economy operates in both
sectors.
3.1.1 Production in the Agricultural and Industrial Sectors
The output produced in the agricultural sector in period t, Y At ; is determined by land, Xt; and labor
employed in the agricultural sector, LAt ; as well as by aggregate agricultural productivity. Aggregate
agricultural productivity comprises three components: the natural level of land productivity,  2
(0; 1); acquired productivity (based on learning by doing), AAt , and public infrastructure, Gt:
The production is governed by a Cobb-Douglas, constant-returns-to-scale production tech-
nology such that
Y At =

AAt +
1

Gt
a
Xa

LAt
1 a
; a 2 (0; 1); (1)
where the supply of land is constant over time and is normalized such that X = 1.14
Hence, natural land productivity, ; is complemented by acquired productivity, AAt ; and is
substituted by public infrastructure, Gt: Moreover, while agricultural infrastructure is benecial
regardless of the level of natural productivity, its marginal benet is higher in less productive places.
The labor force in the agricultural sector is allocated between the production of public
infrastructure and the direct production of nal output. A fraction zt of the labor force employed in
the agricultural sector is devoted to the production of Gt; whereas the remaining fraction (1  zt); is
employed in the production of the nal output.
Hence the production of agricultural output is
Y At =

AAt +
1

zttLt
a
Xa [(1  zt) tLt]1 a ; (2)
where t is the faction of labor employed in the agricultural sector and Lt denotes the total labor
force of the economy in every time period t:
Aggregate productivity in the agricultural sector,
h
AAt +
1
Gt
i
; captures the trade-o¤ be-
tween allocating labor in the production of the nal good and the production of the public good.
14For the emergence of a stable Malthusian equilibrium in the agricultural stage of development, diminishing return
to labor, implied by the presence of a xed factor, is essential.
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Places that are faced with favorable land endowment, may nd it optimal to allocate more resources
to the production of the nal good, whereas unfavorably endowed places, may nd it optimal to
invest more in infrastructure to further enhance land productivity.15
The output of the industrial sector in period t, Y It , is determined by a linear, constant-
returns-to-scale production technology such that
Y It = A
I
tL
I
t = A
I
t (1  t)Lt (3)
where LIt is the labor employed in the industrial sector, (1  t) is the fraction of labor employed in
the industrial sector in period t, and AIt is the level of industrial productivity in period t.
The total labor force in period t, Lt, is allocated between the two sectors. Therefore,
LAt + L
I
t = Lt, (4)
where Lt > 0 in every period t.
As will become evident, in early stages of development, the productivity of the industrial
sector, AIt , is low relative to that of agricultural sector, and output is produced exclusively in the
agricultural sector. However, in later stages of development, AIt rises su¢ ciently relative to the
productivity of agricultural sector, and ultimately the industrial technology becomes economically
viable.
3.1.2 Collective Action in the Production of the Agricultural Infrastructure
Labor in the agricultural sector is allocated between two di¤erent activities. A fraction of the labor,
1 zt; is employed in the production of the nal good, whereas the remaining fraction, zt; is employed
in the production of agricultural infrastructure that is aimed to further enhance land productivity.
The decision over what fraction of the labor is allocated to the production of each good, is made at
the community level before production takes place. The objective of the community is to maximize
output in the agricultural sector.
The community faces a trade-o¤ in the decision to allocate labor to the production of
agricultural infrastructure. More labor in the production of agricultural infrastructure increases
land productivity, but it reduces the labor employed in the production of the nal good.
Optimization Members of the community in every time period t; choose the fraction of labor
employed in the agricultural sector that will be allocated to the production of the public good, so as
to maximize agricultural output, i.e.,
fztg = argmaxY At : (5)
15Di¤erent formulations of the production function, e.g. Y At = A
A
t
h
 + 1

Gt
ia
Xa

LAt
1 a
would could yield
qualitatively similar results under certain assumptions, nevertheless they would complicate the model to the level
of intractability.
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Hence, noting (1),
zt = a  (1  a)
2AAt
tLt
: (6)
Interestingly, the optimal fraction of labor allocated to the development of agricultural in-
frastructure is a decreasing function of natural land productivity, , as well as of acquired agricultural
productivity, At; thereby implying that countries with more favorable land endowment have a
reduced incentive to invest in infrastructure and therefore, choose to allocate more labor to the
direct production of the nal good. Conversely, unfavorably endowed countries, choose to commit
more resources to the development of agricultural infrastructure, as a means to further enhance
natural land productivity.
3.1.3 Factor Prices and Aggregate Labor Allocation
The markets for labor and the production of the nal good are perfectly competitive. Workers in
the agricultural sector receive their average product, given that there are no property rights to land,
and therefore the return to land is zero. Given (2), the wage rate of agricultural labor in time t; wAt ;
is
wAt 
Y At
tLt
=

AAt
tLt
+
1

zt
a
(1  zt)1 a =v1 a

AAt
tLt
+
1


, (7)
where v  aa(1  a)(1 a) 2 (0; 1).
The inverse demand for labor in the industrial sector, given by (3), is
wIt = A
I
t , (8)
where wIt is the wage rate of the industrial labor in period t.
From (7) and (8) it is evident that as employment in the agricultural sector decreases, the
demand for labor increases without bound, while productivity in the industrial sector remains nite.
Hence, the agricultural sector will be operative in every period, whereas the industrial sector will be
operative if and only if labor productivity in this sector exceeds the marginal productivity of labor
in the agricultural sector, if the entire labor force is employed in the agricultural sector. Once the
two sectors become operative, the perfect labor mobility assumption implies an equalization of wages
across sectors.
The following lemma and its associated corollary, respectively, establish conditions on the
level of industrial productivity and, equivalently, on the size of the working population for the
viability of the industrial sector.
Lemma 1 (The Industrial Productivity Threshold for the Economic Viability of the Industrial Sec-
tor) The industrial sector is economically viable in period t if and only if
AIt  v1 a

AAt
Lt
+
1


 A^I  ; AAt ; Lt  A^It .
Proof. Follows from (7)-(8) and the perfect mobility of labor between sectors. 
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The threshold level of productivity, A^It ; reects the fact that workers will start being employed
in the industrial sector if their productivity in that sector, AIt ; is equal to or exceeds the marginal
productivity in the agricultural sector, wAt , as long as the entire labor force, Lt, is employed in the
agricultural sector (i.e. t = 1).
Corollary 1 (The Population Threshold for the Economic Viability of the Industrial Sector) The
industrial sector is economically viable in period t if and only if
Lt  v
2 aAAt
AIt   v a
= L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
  L^t.
To ensure the emergence of the industrial sector, additional restrictions must be imposed on
the initial value of the industrial productivity, i.e. AI0 > v
 a:
Let t 2 (0; 1] denotes the fraction of the economys labor force employed in the agricultural
sector in period t, i.e., t  LAt =Lt. As follows from Lemma 1 and depicted in Figure 1, if AIt < A^It ,
then only the agricultural sector is active and therefore the entire labor force will be employed in
this sector. Therefore the wage rate in the economy, wt, will be the associated wage rate in the
agricultural sector, wIt . However, if A
I
t  A^It , then the industrial sector will become operative, and
perfect mobility of workers between sectors will assure that wt = wAt = w
I
t . Hence, the equilibrium
allocation of labor between the agricultural and industrial sectors in period t, as described by t, is
given by
t  LAt =Lt =
8>><>>:
1 if AIt < A^
I
t
v2 aAAt
AIt v a
1
Lt
if AI  A^It ,
(9)
and, as follows from (7) and (8), the equilibrium wage rate in the economy in period t, wt, is
wt =
8>><>>:
wAt = v
1 a
h
AAt
Lt
+ 1
i
if AIt < A^
I
t
wIt = A
I
t if A
I
t  A^It .
(10)
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Figure 1: The Labor Market Equilibrium
Only Sector A Active Both Sectors A and I Active
Consistent with the historical path of economic development, where agriculture unequivocally
precedes industry, it is assumed that the industrial sector is not economically viable in period 0.
Hence,using the restrictions imposed by Lemma 1
v a < AI0 < v
1 a

AA0
L0
+
1


. (A1)
3.2 Individuals
In every period t, a generation comprising a continuum of Lt economically identical individuals,
enters the labor force. Reproduction occurs asexually and, therefore, each individual has a single
parent. Each member of generation t lives for two periods. In the rst period of life (childhood),
t  1, individuals are raised by their parents who face a xed cost of child-rearing for every child in
the household.16 In the second period of life (parenthood), t, individuals are endowed with one unit
of time, which they allocate entirely to labor force participation.
3.2.1 Preferences and Constraints
The preferences of members of generation t (those born in period t 1) are dened over consumption
as well as the number of their children. They are represented by the utility function
ut = (ct)
 (nt)
1  ;  2 (0; 1) , (11)
where ct is consumption, and nt is the number of children of individual t. The individuals utility
function is therefore strictly monotonically increasing and strictly quasi-concave, satisfying the
16 It is assumed that each child is associated with a xed cost that can be interpreted as purchasing child-rearing
services. Imposing a time cost would not qualitatively change the predictions of the model, as long as technological
progress reduces the amount of time required to raise a child.
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conventional boundary conditions, which ensure the existence of an interior solution to the utility
maximization problem.
Let  > 0 be the cost (in terms of the consumption good) faced by a member of generation t
for raising a child. Income from labor force participation is allocated between expenditure on children
(at a real cost of  per child) and consumption. Hence, the budget constraint faced by a member of
generation t is
ct + nt  wt, (12)
where wt is the labor income of individual t; as given by (10).
3.2.2 Optimization
Members of generation t choose the number of their children and, therefore, their own consumption
so as to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint. Substituting (12) into (11), the
optimization problem for a member of generation t reduces to
nt = argmax
n
(wt   nt) (nt)1 
o
. (13)
The optimal number of children for a member of generation t is therefore
nt =
1  

wt, (14)
which, following (10), yields
nt =
8>><>>:
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt
Lt
+ 1
i
if AIt < A^
I
t
1 
 A
I
t if A
I
t  A^It .
(15)
4 The Time Paths of the Macroeconomic Variables
The time paths of the macroeconomic variables are governed by the dynamics of acquired factor
productivity in both the agricultural and the industrial sector, AAt and A
I
t , as well as the evolution
of the size of the working population, Lt. The evolution of industrial productivity and the size of
the working population are in turn governed by the amount of labor allocated to the production of
agricultural infrastructure and therefore by natural land endowment.17
4.1 The Dynamics of Sectoral Productivity
The level of the acquired productivity in the agricultural and industrial sectors, AAt and A
I
t , is
a¤ected by the productivity level in the previous time period as well as by technological progress,
which reects the incorporation of new knowledge into existing technologies. Industrial productivity
is further enhanced by the level of social capital on industrial specic knowledge creation.
17The structure of the dynamical system is inspired by Ashraf and Galor (2011c).
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In each time period, a fraction of the workforce that is employed in the agricultural sector is
allocated to the construction of the public good. The newly created infrastructure has two e¤ects on
the economy as a whole. A short run and a long run e¤ect. In the short run, it boosts agricultural
production directly, by mitigating the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable natural land endowment.18 In
the long run, the cooperation in the production of agricultural infrastructure, contributes to societal
social capital that ultimately benets the process of industrialization.19
4.1.1 Industrial Productivity
Industrial productivity is being enhanced by two distinct components. The rst component reects
improvements in industrial technology, driven by the new knowledge added by the population
employed in the industrial sector. The second component can be viewed as the social component,
namely the acquired level of social capital (as emerging from cooperation in the agricultural sector),
and its benecial e¤ect on industrial specic new knowledge.20
The evolution of productivity in the industrial sector between periods t and t+1 is determined
by
AIt+1 = A
I
t + (! + ztt)LtA
I
t  AI
 
AAt ; Lt; A
I
t

; (16)
where the initial level of industrial productivity, AI0 > v
 a, is given.
In particular, AIt reects the inertia of past productivity in the industrial sector; !LtA
I
t ;
captures the advancement in productivity due to the application of new knowledge to the existing
level of productivity; ! 2 (0; 1).21
The benecial e¤ect of cooperation for the creation of agricultural infrastructure, on the
industrial productivity, is captured by zttLtAIt , where ztt is the fraction of the population employed
in the production of agricultural infrastructure.22
The benecial e¤ect of past cooperation on the industrial sector through the creation and
accumulation of social capital and ultimately through its e¤ect on the creation of industrial specic
knowledge, is being captured by the level of past productivity, AIt : Cooperation at time t is captured
implicitly as social capital in period t+ 1:
18For simplicity it is assumed that agricultural infrastructure fully depreciates within a period.
19 It is plausibly assumed that when the community decides to construct agricultural infrastructure, it cannot
internalize the externality of the emerging social capital in the latent industrial sector.
20Higher levels of social capital are associated with higher innovation and entrepreneurship, via reducing the
associated risks and providing the necessary network (Putnam, 2000; Greif, 1993)
21! 2 (0; 1) captures the fact that only a fraction of the population contributes to the creation of new knowledge in
the industrial sector. While it can be argued that people employed in the industrial sector can contribute to the creation
of new knowledge in the industrial sector, indirectly, it would be less plausible to argue that all people employed in the
agricultural sector can positively inuence knowledge creation in the industrial sector. It is therefore assumed that a
constant fraction of the total workforce is positively a¤ecting knowledge creation in industry.
22One can assume that once the industrial sector is active each extended household allocates labor to both the
industrial and the agricultural sector. Hence, the entire society is exposed to the externalities of contemporary
cooperation in the agricultural sector.
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4.1.2 Agricultural Productivity
Similarly, the evolution of productivity in the agricultural sector between periods t and t + 1 is
determined by
AAt+1 = A
A
t + (Lt)
(AAt )
b  AA  AAt ; Lt , (17)
where the initial level of agricultural productivity, AA0 > 0, is given.
AAt captures the inertia from past productivity of the agricultural sector in period t; where
 2 (0; 1) captures the erosion in agricultural productivity due to imperfect transmission from
one generation to the other.23 The term (Lt)(AAt )
b captures a "learning by doing e¤ect". In
particular the formulation implies both diminishing returns to population driven knowledge creation,
and a "shing out" e¤ect (i.e.  2 (0; 1)); namely the negative e¤ect of past discoveries on current
discoveries. In addition, it is assumed that there is a lower degree of complementarity between the
advancement of the knowledge frontier and the existing stock of sector-specic productivity in the
agricultural, namely b < 1: Furthermore + b < 1:
It should be noted that agricultural infrastructure is assumed to be fully depreciated within
one period, and the productivity in the agricultural sector is not a¤ected by the level of agricultural
infrastructure.24
4.2 The Dynamics of Population Size
The size of the labor force in any period is determined by the size of the preceding generation and
its fertility rate. As follows from (15), the adult population size evolves over time according to
Lt+1 = ntLt =
8>><>>:
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt +
Lt

i
 LA  ARt ; Lt if Lt < L^t
1 
 A
I
tLt  LI
 
AIt ; Lt

if Lt  L^t,
(18)
where the initial size of the adult population, L0 > 0, is given.
In the agricultural stage of development the dynamics of the population are governed by
acquired productivity in the agricultural sector as well as the size of the adult population, whereas
when both sectors become active, population dynamics are determined by the level of the productivity
in the industrial sector and the size of the adult population. Interestingly, natural land endowment
directly a¤ects population dynamics when the economy operates exclusively in the agricultural sector,
whereas after industrialization it a¤ects population dynamics only indirectly, through its e¤ect on
industrial productivity.
23 It is assumed that erosion takes place in the agricultural sector, since agricultural technology reects mostly human
embodied knowledge and therefore imperfect transmission, as opposed to industrial knowledge. The assumption that
there is no erosion in the industrial sector is a simplication aimed to capture this particular aspect. Nevertheless the
results would hold under any parameterization that would assure smaller depreciation in the industrial sector.
24 If contemporary infrastructure is long lasting and society would internalize its future e¤ects on agricultural output,
the qualitative analysis will remain intact, however it would complicate the model to the level of intractability.
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5 The Process of Development
This section focuses on the role of natural land endowment in determining the characteristics of the
Malthusian equilibrium and the timing of the take-o¤ from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to
a state of sustained economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that countries with unfavorable
natural land endowment are being dominated by more favorably endowed countries in the Malthusian
regime. Hence, in an e¤ort to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land, they cooperate more intensely in
the production of agricultural infrastructure, which ultimately results to the emergence of higher
levels of social capital. Due to the complementarity of social capital with the industrial sector,
these countries industrialize faster, and therefore, escape Malthusian stagnation to enter a state of
sustained economic growth.
The process of economic development, given the natural land productivity, ; is fully de-
termined by a sequence

AAt ; A
I
t ; Lt; 
	1
t=0
that reects the evolution of the acquired productivity
in the agricultural sector, AAt , the productivity in the industrial sector, A
I
t , and the size of adult
population, Lt. Specically, noting (16), (17), and (18), the dynamic path of the economy is given
by 8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Lt+1 = ntLt =
8>><>>:
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt +
Lt

i
 LA  ARt ; Lt if Lt < L^t
1 
 A
I
tLt  LI
 
AIt ; Lt

if Lt  L^t,
AAt+1 = A
A
t + (Lt)
(AAt )
b = AA
 
AAt ; Lt

AIt+1 = A
I
t + (! + ztt)LtA
I
t = A
I
 
AAt ; A
I
t ; Lt

(19)
where, consistent with the process of development, the initial conditions,
 
AA0 ; A
I
0; L0

, are set to
satisfy assumption (A1).
5.1 The Dynamical System
To analyze the evolution of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial regime, a series
of phase diagrams is employed, that captures the evolution of the system within the Malthusian
epoch, as well as the endogenous transition to industrialization. The analysis underlines the role of
natural land endowment and cooperation in the development of infrastructure in agricultural sector,
in determining the characteristics of the Malthusian equilibrium and the timing of the take-o¤ to the
industrial era.25
The phase diagrams, depicted in Figures 2-3, describe the evolution of the system in the 
AAt ; Lt

plane, conditional on the level of AIt . The evolution of A
I
t generates a phase transition of
25The analysis is focusing on the transition from a Malthusian regime to an industrialization regime and the forces
that led to a faster industrialization. The forces that eventually led to the demographic transition and the emergence
of the modern growth regime are not being explored in the context of this research. The underlying assumption behind
this approach is the historical observation that a "reversal of fortune" has been observed initially with respect to
the timing of industrialization. The model could be expanded to account for the current growth regime however this
extension would just increase the complexity of the model without adding new insights.
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the dynamical system and brings about a qualitative change that is associated with industrialization
and the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
Three geometric elements are crucial for building the phase diagrams and are instrumental for
the determination of motion within the system: the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, which separates
the regions in which the economy is exclusively operating in the agricultural sector from those where
it operates in both the industrial and the agricultural sector; the AA locus, which denotes the set of
all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

for which the acquired productivity in the agricultural sector is constant; and the
LL locus, which denotes the set of all pairs for which the size of the workforce is constant, conditional
on the latency of the industrial sector.
5.1.1 The Conditional Malthusian Frontier
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier is a geometric locus, in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, that separates the
regions where the economy operates exclusively on the agricultural sector from the region where it
operates in both sectors. Once the economys trajectory crosses this frontier, the industrial sector
becomes operative.
Let the Conditional Malthusian Frontier be the set of all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

such that, for a given
level of industrial productivity, AIt , the entrepreneurs in the economy are indi¤erent as to whether
to operate the industrial sector or not. Following Corollary 1, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier,
MMjAIt , as depicted in Figures 2-3, is
MMjAIt 
n 
AAt ; Lt

: Lt = L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
o
. (20)
Lemma 2 (The Properties of the Conditional Malthusian Frontier) If
 
AAt ; Lt
 2 MMjAIt , then
along the MMjAIt frontier,
Lt =
v2 aAAt
AIt   v a
 L^  AAt ; AIt  ,
where @L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

=@AAt > 0, and @L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

=@AIt < 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from (20), Corollary 1, and di¤erentiation. 
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier is therefore an upward sloping ray from the origin in
the
 
AAt ; Lt

space. From Corollary 1, it becomes evident that the region strictly below the frontier
denotes that production takes place exclusively in the agricultural sector whereas the region (weakly)
above the frontier, denotes that the economy operates both in the industrial and the agricultural
sector. As AIt increases in the process of development, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier rotates
clockwise in
 
AAt ; Lt

space.
Lemma 3 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier)
Given AAt > 0 and A
I
t > 0, for all Lt  L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

,
Lt+1   Lt T 0 , AIt T 1 
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Proof. Follows immediately from (18). 
Hence, if the industrial sector is operational, (i.e., if the economy is in the region above the
MMjAIt frontier in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space), the evolution of the size of the workforce depends on the level
of AIt relative to a critical level, = (1  ). In particular, when industrial productivity is below the
threshold, = (1  ), the wage rate in the economy is not su¢ ciently high to sustain fertility beyond
replacement, thereby implying that the size of the workforce declines in size over time. Conversely
if AIt is above the critical threshold, then the wage rate is su¢ ciently high to sustain fertility above
the replacement level and hence the workforce increases in size over time.
5.1.2 The AA Locus
Let the AA locus be the set of all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

such that the level of agricultural productivity, AAt ,
is in a steady state:
AA   AAt ; Lt : AAt+1  AAt = 0	 . (21)
Lemma 4 (The Properties of the AA Locus) If
 
AAt ; Lt
 2 AA, then along the AA locus,
Lt = (1  )1=
 
AAt
1 b=  LAA  AAt  ,
where @LAA
 
AAt

=@AA > 0 and @2LAA
 
AAt

=
 
@AAt
2
> 0.
Proof. Noting (21), the functional form of LAA
 
AAt

is obtained by algebraically manipulating (17)
under AAt+1 = A
A
t . The remainder follows directly from di¤erentiation. 
Corollary 2 (The Dynamics of Agricultural Productivity with respect to the AA Locus) Given AAt >
0,
AAt+1  AAt T 0 if and only if Lt T LAA
 
AAt

Hence, the AA locus, as depicted in Figures 2-3, is a strictly convex, upward sloping curve
from the origin in
 
AAt ; Lt

space. AAt grows over time above the AA locus, due to the fact that
there is a su¢ ciently large cohort of adults that ensure the advancement of the knowledge frontier
that can overcome the erosion e¤ect of imperfect intergenerational transmission of knowledge on
AAt . Respectively, below the AA locus, the advancement of the knowledge frontier is not su¢ cient
to overcome the eroding e¤ects of imperfect intergenerational transmission on AAt ; and therefore,
agricultural productivity diminishes over time:
5.1.3 The LL Locus
Let the LL locus be the set of all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

such that, conditional on the latency of the industrial
sector, the size of the adult population, Lt, is in a steady state:
LL 
n 
AAt ; Lt

: Lt+1   Lt = 0 j Lt < L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
o
. (22)
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Lemma 5 (The Properties of the LL Locus) If
 
AAt ; Lt
 2 LL, then along the LL locus,
Lt=
(1  )v2 aAAt
   (1  )v a L
LL
 
AAt

,
where  > (1  )v a; dLLLt =dAAt > 0, and d2LLLt =
 
dAAt
2
= 0.
Proof. Noting (22), the functional form of LLL
 
AAt

is obtained from the algebraic manipulation
of (18) under Lt+1 = Lt. The remainder follows immediately from di¤erentiation. 
Corollary 3 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the LL Locus) Given AAt > 0 and
AIt > 0, for all Lt < L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

,
Lt+1   Lt S 0 if and only if Lt T LLL
 
AAt

Hence, the LL locus, as depicted in Figures 2-3, is an upward sloping ray from the origin
in
 
AAt ; Lt

space. Lt grows over time below the LL locus due to the fact that since population
is su¢ ciently low, it allows for a high wage rate which permits fertility to be above replacement.
Reversely, Lt declines over time above the LL locus, since the population is higher than its steady
state level, thereby implying a su¢ ciently low wage rate that sustains fertility below the replacement
level. The position of the LL locus, in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, relative to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier,
MMjAIt , is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (The Position of the LL Locus relative to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier) Given
AIt > 0, for all A
A
t such that

AAt ; L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
 2MMjAIt and  AAt ; LLL  AAt  2 LL,
L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

T LLL
 
AAt

if and only if AIt S (1 ) .
Proof. Follows from comparing the functional forms of L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

and LLL
 
AAt

as specied in
Corollary 1 and Lemma 5 respectively. 
Thus, for AIt < =(1  ), the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt , is located above the
LL locus. In the process of development though, MMjAIt rotates clockwise driven by the growth of
AIt and ultimately the two loci coincide when A
I
t = =(1   ): After this point, for AIt > =(1   )
the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt , drops below the LL locus.
So far it has become evident that growth in the latent industrial sector productivity, AIt , has
an inuence on the global dynamics of the size of the workforce, which in turn reects a transition of
the system from the Malthusian to the Post-Malthusian regime. The following lemma is summarizing
the dynamics of the workforce.
Lemma 7 (The Dynamics of the Workforce with respect to the LL Locus and the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier) Given AIt > 0, for all A
A
t > 0,
1. If AIt <

(1 ) , then
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the Conditional Malthusian Frontier is above the LL locus, i.e.,
L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

> LLL
 
AAt

,
and
Lt+1   Lt
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
< 0 if Lt > LLL
 
AAt

= 0 if Lt = LLL
 
AAt

> 0 if Lt < LLL
 
AAt

;
2. If AIt >

(1 ) , then
the Conditional Malthusian Frontier is below the LL locus, i.e.,
L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

< LLL
 
AAt

,
and, for all Lt,
Lt+1   Lt > 0.
Proof. Part (1) follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 6, and Corollary 3. Part (2) follows from
the same Lemmas while observing that, above the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, Lt+1   Lt > 0
if AIt > = (1  ), and if Lt is below the LL locus. 
5.1.4 The Phase Diagrams
Figures 2-3, illustrated the steady state in agricultural stage of development, and the transition
from agriculture to industry. Figure 2 illustrates the agricultural stage of development, in which the
economy is in a steady state and is characterized by Malthusian dynamics, Figure 3 illustrates the
endogenous take-o¤ to industrialization, where the economy enters a regime of sustained growth in
per worker output and population.
The Agricultural Stage of Development Figure 2 illustrates the economy when operating in
the agricultural stage of development, i.e. when productivity in the (latent) industrial sector, AIt ; is
below the critical level = (1  ) :
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Figure 2: The Agricultural Stage of Development
This implies that the MMjAIt frontier in this stage resides above the LL locus, thereby
implying that the economy is in a Malthusian regime and is characterized by a globally stable steady
state equilibrium, (AAss; Lss), as dened by the point of intersection of the AA and LL loci. Using
the functional forms of LAA
 
AAt ; 

and LLL
 
AAt ; 

, specied in Lemmas 4 and 5 respectively, the
Malthusian steady-state values of productivity in the agricultural sector, AAss; and the size of the
adult population, Lss, are given by
AAss =
1
(1  ) 11 b
"
   (1  ) v a(1  ) 11 b
(1  )v2 a
# 
 1+b+
 AAss () ; (23)
Lss =
"
   (1  ) v a(1  ) 11 b
(1  )v2 a
# 1 b
 1+b+
 Lss () . (24)
The system is characterized by a globally stable steady-state equilibrium.26 At early stages
of development, productivity in the latent industrial sector is quite low and therefore the economy
operates exclusively in the agricultural sector. Therefore the MMjAIt locus is located above the
LL locus. In addition, in the region above the MMjAIt locus, as follows from Lemma 3, the size
of the workforce diminishes over time, which eventually places the economy below the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier. Since the industrial sector is not yet sustainable in this stage of development,
the economy converges to an agricultural regime characterized by a Malthusian equilibrium. In
26The unstable trivial steady state located at the origin of
 
AAt ; Lt

space is eliminated given AA0 > 0 and L0 > 0:
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the region below the MMjAIt locus and above the LL locus, there is rather high workforce that
implies wage rates so small as to place fertility below replacement rates and therefore the workforce
diminishes over time. Conversely, below the LL locus, the size of the workforce is su¢ ciently small to
allow for high wage rates and therefore for fertility above replacement, thereby implying an increasing
population size.
Since the analysis takes place in the context of a discrete dynamical system, additional
conditions are necessary to ensure that convergence to the steady state takes place monotonically
over time and not in an oscillatory way.27 Figure 2 is depicting the trajectories under the assumption
that the parametric conditions described in Lemma 8 that ensure that the conditional dynamical
system is locally nonoscillatory in the vicinity of the conditional Malthusian steady state.
The following Lemma imposes conditions on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the
conditional dynamical system evaluated at the steady-state equilibrium.
Lemma 8 (The Local Stability Properties of the Conditional Malthusian Steady State) If AIt <
= (1  ), then the conditional steady-state equilibrium,  AAss; Lss, of the dynamical system in (19)
is:
1. characterized by the local monotonic evolution of both state variables, ARt and Lt, if and only
if the Jacobian matrix,
J
 
ARss; Lss

=
264 @A
A
 
AAss; Lss;!

=@AAt @A
A
 
AAss; Lss;!

=@Lt
@L
 
AAss; Lss

=@ARt @L
 
ARss; Lss

=@Lt
375 ,
has eigenvalues that are real and positive, i.e., if
 <
"
(1  ) v

[(1  ) b1 b + b(1  ) 11 b + (1  ) 1(1 b) ]

#1=a
.
2. is locally asymptotically stable.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The Industrial Stage of Development Figure 3 illustrates the dynamical system in the indus-
trial stage of development, i.e. when industrial productivity, AIt , exceeds the critical level, = (1  ) :
27The analysis would not be qualitatively di¤erent even in the case where the evolution towards the steady state
took place in an oscillatory manner, since this is a feature that appears to be present during the Malthusian epoch.
See, for example, Lagerlöf (2006) and Galor (2011).
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Figure 3: Industrialization and the Take-o¤
At this stage of development, the MMjAIt frontier resides below the LL locus, as established
in Lemma 7, and the economy enters a stage of sustained growth. Above the MMjAIt frontier, the
wage rate increases over time, thereby allowing an increase in the size of the workforce as well as a
sustained increase in productivity and output per worker.
The Transition from Agriculture to Industry The growth in productivity of the latent
industrial sector in the process of development, from its initial level below the critical threshold,
= (1  ), to a level beyond this threshold is driving the transition from agriculture to industry.
Consistent with historical evidence, the transition from agriculture to industry, requires the
emergence of the agricultural sector prior to the emergence of the industrial sector, i.e. the initial
level of industrial productivity must satisfy the following condition.
AI0 < = (1  ) . (A3)
To assure the transition to the industrialization era, it is su¢ cient to assume that (latent) industrial
productivity grows monotonically and eventually exceeds the critical magnitude, = (1  ).
Let gt+1 denote the rate of productivity growth in the industrial sector between periods t
and t+ 1. It follows directly from (16) that
gIt+1 
AIt+1  AIt
AIt
= (1 + zt)Lt  gI
 
Lt; A
A
t ; 

. (25)
thereby implying that productivity in the industrial sector is growing over time, which ensures
the transition from the agricultural stage of development to industry.
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5.2 The Evolution of the Economy
The evolution of the economy is initially characterized by a Malthusian steady-state. The economy
initially operates exclusively in the agricultural sector but ultimately it experiences an endogenous
industrialization and a subsequent take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
5.2.1 The Agricultural Economy
In early stages of development, the economy operates exclusively in the agricultural sector due to
the fact that the productivity in the (latent) industrial sector, AIt , is too low to allow the industrial
sector to become operative (satisfying assumptions (A1) and (A3)). In this stage of development, the
economy is in a Malthusian regime and the dynamical system, illustrated in Figure 2, has a globally
stable steady-state equilibrium, (AIss; Lss); towards which it gravitates monotonically.
Since at this stage of development only the agricultural sector is operative, the whole adult
population is employed in this sector, and therefore from (2) it follows that the steady-state level of
income per worker is
yss =

1   (26)
Using (23) and (24), the steady-state level of income per worker captures the property of the
Malthusian steady-state, that the long-run level of income is constant and independent of the level
of technology. Therefore a higher productivity per worker is counterbalanced by a larger size of the
working population.
5.2.2 From Agriculture to Industry
The driving force behind the transition from agriculture to industry, is the growth of productivity
in the (latent) industrial sector. In the process of development, increases in the industrial pro-
ductivity, rotate the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt clockwise in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space of
Figure 2. Eventually, productivity of the industrial sector surpasses the critical threshold level
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt
Lt
+ 1
i
; which renders the industrial sector operative and drops the Conditional Malthu-
sian Frontier below the LL locus as depicted in Figure 3.
As the economy enters the era of industrialization, there no longer exists a globally stable
Malthusian steady state in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space. Upon entering into the industrialization regime, the
economy enters into an era of sustained endogenous growth, where income per worker is growing
over time driven by the growth of industrial productivity.
5.3 Natural Land Endowment and Comparative Development
The e¤ect of natural land endowment on comparative development, through the emergence of
cooperation and social capital, can be examined based on the e¤ect of the land endowment on
Malthusian equilibrium outcomes in the agricultural stage of development, and on the timing of
industrialization and the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
Proposition 1 (The E¤ect of Natural Land Endowment on the Equilibrium in the Agricultural Stage
of Development) Under assumption (A2), as long as the economy remains exclusively agricultural,
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an increase in the quality of natural land endowment has a benecial e¤ect on the steady-state levels
of productivity in the agricultural sector and the size of the adult population,and no e¤ect on steady
state income per capita, i.e.
dyss=d = 0
and for  > (1 )v2(1 )
1
1 b
(2 a)
dAAss=d > 0 and dLss=d > 0
Proof. Follows immediately from di¤erentiating (23), (24), and (26) with respect to  while noting
assumption (A2).28 
Figure 4: The E¤ect of an Increase in Natural Land Endowment on the Malthusian Equilibrium
Geometrically, as depicted in Figure 4, a higher value of ; while it leaves the AA locus
una¤ected, it causes the LL locus to reside closer to the Lt-axis in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, thereby yielding
higher steady-state levels of adult population size and agricultural productivity.
Therefore, an economy that is characterized by more favorable natural land endowment,
is also associated with a relatively superior conditional Malthusian steady state in terms of the
economys level of agricultural productivity per worker and the size of its working population.
28Note that if  < (1 )v2(1 )
1
1 b
(2 a) ; the this would imply that dA
A
ss=d < 0 and dLss=d < 0; i.e. that for su¢ ciently
low levels of land productivity, an increase in land productivity may adversely a¤ect steady state values of population
and agricultural productivity. However, this result captures the e¤ect of land productivity through the incentives
for investment in infrastructure. Had this channel been shut o¤, i.e., investment in infrastructure is not feasible,
then dAAss=d > 0 and dLss=d > 0 8 : Therefore to be consistent with historical evidence that suggests that more
fertile places were sustaining larger populations, the analysis is limited to the range of productivities where  >
(1 )v2(1 )
1
1 b
(2 a) :
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In accordance with the predictions of the Malthusian theory (Ashraf and Galor, 2011a), the
long-run level of income per capita is not a¤ected by variations in natural land productivity, thereby
implying that adjustments in population and productivity were such that equalized long-run income
per capita across countries.
The inferiority of the conditional Malthusian steady state, in a society with more favorable
natural land endowment, stems from the fact that agricultural production in these places is higher,
and they can therefore sustain a larger population.
Variations in natural land endowment, however, have an e¤ect on the level of cooperation
in the production of agricultural infrastructure and on the timing of industrialization (through the
creation and transmission of social capital) and thus, on the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic
growth. This e¤ect is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The E¤ect of Natural Land Endowment on the Timing of Industrialization and the
Take-o¤ from Malthusian Stagnation) Consider an economy in a conditional Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium. Under assumptions (A2) and (A4), an increase in natural land productivity, can have a
detrimental e¤ect on the timing of the adoption of industry and, thus, on the timing of the take-o¤
from Malthusian stagnation, i.e.,29
dgIss=d > 0 if  >
h
(1 )v
 (1  a)(! + a) + (1  )
1
1 b
i1=a
Proof. Follows immediately from di¤erentiating (25) in the steady state with respect to  . 
Hence, if natural land productivity is su¢ ciently high, then it can have an adverse e¤ect
on productivity growth in the (latent) industrial sector at the conditional Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium. The earlier take-o¤ from the conditional Malthusian steady state by a society with
less favorable natural land endowment, stems from the fact that the cooperation in the agricultural
sector to develop infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land, generates higher social
capital, a crucial element for the development of the industrial sector. Therefore productivity growth
in the (latent) industrial sector is higher for less productive countries in the process of development.
29 It should be noted that the restrictions on  in Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 8, are mutually consistent for a
range of parameter values.
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Figure 5: Overtaking of the Low Land Productivity Economy in the Industrialization Era
Geometrically, as depicted in Figure 4, for su¢ ciently high ; a higher value of  causes
the MMjAIt frontier to reside closer to the Lt-axis in
 
AAt ; Lt

space. This, combined with the fact
that industrial productivity in the more productive place takes place at a lower pace, implies that
favorably endowed places may industrialize later, as depicted in Figure 5.
Following Propositions 1 and 2, variation in natural land endowment across societies is
associated with the phenomenon of overtaking.
Corollary 4 (Natural Land Endowment and Overtaking) Consider two societies indexed by i 2
fU;Pg. Suppose that society U is characterized by a lower natural land endowment and that U < P ,
where i is the natural land endowment of society i. Society U will then be characterized by an inferior
productivity in the Malthusian regime, but it can overtake society P via an earlier take-o¤ into the
industrial regime.
6 Cross-Country Evidence
This section empirically examines the hypotheses that (i) a reversal of fortune in the process of
development can be traced to variation in land suitability across countries. Economies characterized
by favorable land endowment dominated the world economy in the agricultural stage of development
but were overtaken in the process of industrialization, (ii) lower level of land suitability in the past
is associated with higher levels of contemporary social capital, and (iii) cooperation, as reected by
agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places were land was not highly productive and
collective action could diminish the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance agricultural
output.
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6.1 Empirical Strategy and Data
6.1.1 Empirical Strategy
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis will rst establish that a reversal
of fortune in the process of economic development can be traced to the e¤ect of land endowment
on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector. The examination of comparative
development at the agricultural stage of development employs a Malthusian perspective, thereby
assuming that technologically advanced economies had a larger rather than richer population (Ashraf
and Galor, 2011). Hence, as a proxy for prosperity in the agricultural stage of development, the
research employs historical data on population density as opposed to income per capita and examines
the hypothesized e¤ect of land suitability on population densities in the years 1, 1000 and 1500. In
examining the impact of land suitability in economic outcomes in agricultural societies, the analysis
controls for a number of alternative channels. These channels include the timing of the Neolithic
Revolution, due to its impact on the advancement and di¤usion of agricultural technologies, as well
as geographical factors, such as absolute latitude, access to waterways, average ruggedness, average
elevation as well as dummies for landlocked countries, islands and continental xed e¤ects, all of
which may have had a persistent e¤ect on agricultural output and economic outcomes.
To establish a reversal of fortune with respect to natural land endowment, the analysis
employs cross country variation in land suitability, to explain the cross-country variation in log
income per capita in the year 2000. A number of potentially confounding factors and alternative
hypothesis suggested by the related literature on comparative development are accounted for. The
geography channel is controlled through a number of geographical controls that may a¤ect economic
outcomes today. The institutional hypothesis, that suggests that a "reversal of fortune" can be
traced to the impact of European colonization on comparative development, is accounted for through
a number of controls including European colonies dummies, legal origins dummies and institutional
quality controls. Furthermore, controls for the disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and
religion shares are employed.
Importantly, as suggested by the theory, it is not the direct e¤ect of land suitability that
drives the reversal of fortune but instead the portable component associated with land suitability,
namely the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation. In the absence of migration,
the countrys level of social capital is captured by its natural land endowment. However, in the
post-colonial era, where mass migration has taken place, the level of social capital in each country
reects the weighted average of land suitability among its ancestral population. Hence, in order
to capture this distinction, two alternative empirical strategies are adopted. First, the sample is
restricted to countries with a large percentage of native population, thereby implying that the social
capital that has been accumulated in the past, is still a prevalent norm among the native population.
Second, the measure of land suitability is adjusted to capture the portable component of natural
land endowment. Therefore a measure of adjusted land suitability is constructed using the weighted
average of the land suitability of the ancestral population of each country today. The adjustment
of the land suitability index is based on the migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil
(2010), which provides estimates of the proportion of the ancestors in the year 1500 of one countrys
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population today that were living within what are now the borders of that and each of the other
countries.
Second, the empirical analysis establishes that the reversal of fortune captures the adverse
e¤ect of natural land productivity on social capital as reected by the contemporary level of gen-
eralized trust. Importantly, since the portable component associated with land suitability, namely
the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation, a¤ects the current level of trust, the
measure of land suitability is adjusted to capture the portable component of natural land endowment,
namely social capital, using the weighted average of the land suitability of the ancestral population
of each country today. A number of alternative channels are accounted for, namely geographical and
institutional factors, ethnic fractionalization, disease environment and dummies for continents, legal
origins, European colonies and major religion shares. In addition, an alternative measure of trust is
employed, namely the extent of participation in civic activities (La Porta et al., 1997). Furthermore,
as an additional robustness check, the unadjusted measure of land suitability is employed and the
sample of countries is restricted to those with native population larger than 75%, as an additional
robustness control.
Third, the empirical analysis establishes that higher suitability of land for agriculture is
associated with a lower level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as reected by the fraction of
irrigated land. In the absence of extensive cross-country data on irrigation prior to industrialization,
the analysis is based on the fraction of irrigated land for a sample of non-industrial countries in
the year 1900. The exclusion of industrialized countries is based upon membership in the OECD in
the year 1985, under the assumption that membership was restricted to advanced, and thus early
industrialized countries. In the light of the fact that industrialized countries are more advanced
technologically, the restriction of the sample is aimed to eliminate the possibility that the extent
of irrigation is capturing the stage of development as opposed to the trade-o¤s associated with the
development of infrastructure.
Given that in the year 1900 mass migration has already taken place in a number of countries, a
potential concern would be that irrigation is a¤ected by some sort of specic human capital carried by
the migrants, which could reduce the opportunity cost associated with the development of irrigation.
Hence in order to capture this aspect the sample is restricted to countries with a large percentage of
native population.30
In the absence of more extensive data on agricultural infrastructure in antiquity, the adverse
e¤ect of natural land productivity on cooperation in earlier periods is examined based on several
proxies of cooperation: a) communication in the year 1 CE, b) transportation in the year 1 CE,
and c) medium of exchange in the year 1 CE. According to the theory, sophisticated means of
communication, transportation and medium of exchange have been catalysts in the advancement
of large-scale cooperation, and thus, under-development of these technologies reects the adverse
e¤ect of land suitability on the extent of cooperation. Nevertheless, it could be plausibly argued
that the advancement of these technologies captures the degree of trade, associated with higher land
suitability, as opposed to the emergence of cooperation in an environment characterized by lower
30 It could be plausibly argued though that since early industrialized countries are excluded from the sample, migration
is unlikely to be a major factor in the analysis.
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land suitability. Reassuringly however, a more suitable land for agriculture in these societies had
an adverse e¤ect on the technological levels of these three sectors, suggesting that the dominating
e¤ect was indeed that of reduced cooperation. Moreover, the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the
development of these technologies remains signicant if the degree of inequality in the suitability of
land for agriculture a more direct proxy for the trade channel in early stages of development is
accounted for. The analysis further controls for a number of channels, that may have had a persistent
e¤ect on cooperation, including the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, geographical factors, such as
absolute latitude, access to waterways, average ruggedness, average elevation as well as dummies for
landlocked countries, islands and continents.
6.1.2 The Data
Data on historical population density (in persons per square km) are derived by McEvedy and Jones
(1978). Despite the inherent measurement problems associated with historical data, they are widely
regarded as a standard source for population and income per capita data in the long-run growth
literature.31
Land suitability measure is an index of the average suitability of land for cultivation, based
on geospatial data on various ecological factors, related to climatic factors and soil quality. These
factors include (i) growing degree days, (ii) the ratio of potential to actual evapotranspiration, (iii) soil
carbon density, and (iv) soil pH. Therefore biophysical factors, such as topography and irrigation,
and socioeconomic factors such as market price or incentive structure, which are important for
determining whether land will be cultivated, are not part of the index.32 The index is reported
at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002). The average of land quality is thus the
average value of the index across the grid cells within a country. This measure is obtained from
Michalopoulos (2011).
One potential source of concern with respect to the measure of land suitability is whether
current data on the suitability of land for cultivation reect land suitability in the past. Importantly,
the critical aspect of the data for the tested hypothesis is the ranking of countries with respect to
their land suitability as opposed to the actual measure of land suitability. Hence the identifying
assumption is that the ranking of land suitability as measured today, reects the ranking of land
suitability in the past.
If intense cultivation and human intervention a¤ected soil quality over time, this could
have a¤ected all countries proportionally and therefore it would introduce a non-systematic error.
This would not only leave the ranking of countries with respect to land suitability for agriculture
una¤ected, but would also enhance the di¢ culty to detect a signicant e¤ect on land suitability.
Importantly, even in the presence of a systematic error, it would be implausible to argue that the
ranking of countries with respect to land suitability has been reversed, based on two observations,
similar to the ones made by Michalopoulos (2011) and Nunn and Qian (2011). First, one of the two
components of the index is based upon climatic conditions, which have not signicantly changed
31For a more extensive discussion on this data see Ashraf and Galor (2011a).
32The argument for adopting such an approach is based upon the observation that at the global scale, climate and
soil factors form the major constraints on cultivation, and adequately describe the major patterns of agricultural land
(Ramankutty et al., 2002),
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during the period of examination.33 Therefore, even if the characteristics of soil quality have
signicantly changed over time, this would still have a limited e¤ect on the total index of land
suitability. Second, given that the measure of land suitability captures the average level of land
suitability within a given country, it would be implausible to anticipate that deteriorations in land
quality in particular segments of the country, could a¤ect the average land quality of a country, to
the extent that it would change its overall ranking.
The adjustment of the land suitability index is based on the use of the migration matrix
constructed by Putterman andWeil (2010) which provides estimates of the proportion of the ancestors
in the year 1500 of one countrys population today that were living within what are now the borders
of that and each of the other countries. The measure of adjusted land suitability is the weighted
average of the land suitability of the ancestral population of each country today. The migration
matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010) is also the basis of the measure of the percentage of native
population, as constructed by (Ashraf and Galor, 2011a).
Data on irrigation are reported by Freydank and Siebert (2008), who have constructed a set
of annual values of area equipped for irrigation for all 236 countries during the time period 1900 -
2003.34 The Irrigation variable employs data for the year 1900 and is expressed as the fraction of
irrigated land over arable land. Despite the fact that data is from the year 1900, evidence suggests
that most countries have changed little with respect to the land equipped for irrigation during the
20th century, thereby implying that major expansions in their irrigation systems have primarily
occurred prior to industrialization. In addition, data for the period prior 1900 were used as a basis
for interpolation, again indicating that a signicant part of the irrigation infrastructure had been
constructed in the years prior industrialization (Framji et al., 1981).
Data on a) Communication in the year 1 b) Transportation in the year 1 c) Medium of
Exchange in the year 1 are constructed from Peregrines (2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and
aggregated at the country level by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). Each of these three sectors is reported
on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various anthropological and historical sources. The level of
technology in each sector is indexed as follows. In the communications sector, the index is assigned
a value of 0 under the absence of both true writing and mnemonic or non-written records, a value of
1 under the presence of only mnemonic or non-written records, and a value of 2 under the presence
of both. In the transportation sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence of both
vehicles and pack or draft animals, a value of 1 under the presence of only pack or draft animals, and
a value of 2 under the presence of both. In the Medium of Exchange sector, the index is assigned
a value of 0 under the absence of domestically used articles and currency, a value of one under the
presence of only domestically used articles and the value of 2 under the presence of both. In all
cases, the sector-specic indices are normalized to assume values in the [0,1]-interval. Given that
the cross-sectional unit of observation in Peregrines dataset is an archaeological tradition or culture,
specic to a given region on the global map, and since spatial delineations in Peregrines dataset
33Durante (2010) has examined at the relationship between climatic conditions for the years 1900-2000 and 1500-
1900. In particular he looks at the relationship separately for average precipitation, average temperature, precipitation
variability and temperature variability. His ndings conrm that regions with more variable climate in the present
years were also characterized by more variate climate in the past, thereby reassuringly implying that climatic conditions
have not signicantly changed over time.
34The values are provided in 1000 ha units
33
do not necessarily correspond to contemporary international borders, the culture-specic technology
index in a given year is aggregated to the country level by averaging across those cultures from
Peregrines map that appear within the modern borders of a given country.
Data on trust come for the World Values Survey. They are built upon the fraction of total
respondents within a given country, from ve di¤erent waves (1981-2008) based on their answers on
the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant
be too careful in dealing with people".
6.2 Empirical Findings
6.2.1 The Impact of Land Suitability on Development in the Agricultural Stage
Table 1 establishes, in line with the theory, that favorable land endowment had a benecial impact on
economic development in the agricultural stage. Specically, accounting for a variety of potentially
confounding factors, the table demonstrates the positive e¤ect of the log land suitability on log
population density in the year 150035.
Employing a 148 cross-country sample, Column (1) reveals that log land productivity possesses a
statistically signicant positive relationship with population density in the year 1500, conditional on
continental xed e¤ects. The estimated linear coe¢ cient associated with log land suitability implies
that a 1% increase in land suitability would increase population density by 0.57% in the year 1500.
Column (2) augments the analysis of Column (1) with a number of exogenous geographical
controls, all of which are important determinants of population density in the Malthusian epoch, as
established in the empirical analysis of Ashraf and Galor (2011a). In particular it employs controls
on absolute latitude, access to waterways, average ruggedness, average elevation as well as dummies
for landlocked countries and islands, all of which may have had a persistent e¤ect on agricultural
output and economic outcomes. While these other factors do indeed confer statistically signicant
e¤ects on population density in the year 1500, log land suitability continues to have a statistically
signicant benecial impact on economic development in this period, with the point estimate of the
relevant coe¢ cient remaining largely unchanged in comparison to its estimate in Column (1).
The regression presented in Column (3) further augments the analysis with additional controls
on the timing of the Neolithic Revolution which has been argued to have had a benecial e¤ect on
economic outcomes in the year 1500. Nevertheless and despite the statistical signicance of this
channel, the point estimate and statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient associated with log land
suitability remains largely intact.
Column (4) introduces into the analysis distance from the nearest technological frontier as
derived by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). As predicted in their research, distance from the nearest
technological frontier has a signicant negative impact on economic development. Reassuringly
however, and despite the signicance of this channel, the point estimate and statistical signicance
of the coe¢ cient associated with log land suitability remains remarkably stable. According to the
35Similar results are establishes for the e¤ect of log land on log population density in the years 1CE and 1000 CE.
and can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 1: Land Suitability and Comparative Development in the Agricultural Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Log Population Density in 1500
Log Land Suitability 0.572*** 0.428*** 0.442*** 0.431***
(0.0753) (0.0644) (0.0578) (0.0531)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.180 0.247* 0.254**
(0.134) (0.125) (0.114)
Log Average Elevation -0.00712 -0.126 -0.158
(0.124) (0.124) (0.103)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.422*** -0.303** -0.373***
(0.161) (0.144) (0.142)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.415** -0.376** -0.370**
(0.196) (0.172) (0.165)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.930** 0.841** 0.745**
(0.366) (0.350) (0.330)
Log Years Since Neolithic 1.108*** 0.873***
(0.213) (0.218)
Distance to Frontier in 1500 0.201***
(0.0383)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 148 148 148 148
R-squared 0.553 0.671 0.724 0.754
Summary This table establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of land suitability on population density
in the year 1500, while controlling for average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude, access
to navigable waterways, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological
frontier and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based
on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the
ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for
cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) the set of continent dummies in Columns
(1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. An Oceania dummy is
not included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression samples,
restricted by the availability of income per capita data; (iii) a single continent dummy is used to
represent the Americas, which is natural given the historical period examined; (iv) robust standard
error estimates are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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regression, a 1% increase in land suitability is associated with a 0.43% increase in population density
in the year 1500.
The evidence presented in Table 1 therefore establishes, in accordance with the theory, that
indeed favorable land endowment had a benecial impact on economic development during the
agricultural stage of development. The positive e¤ect of land suitability on economic outcomes
in the year 1500 is depicted on the scatter plot in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Land Suitability and Population Density in the Year 1500
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coef = .43111355, (robust) se = .05314358, t = 8.11
Table 2 establishes, in line with the theory, that favorable land endowment has an adverse
e¤ect on current economic outcomes, thereby establishing a reversal of fortune. Importantly, as
suggested by the theory, it is not the direct e¤ect of land suitability that drives the reversal of fortune
but instead the portable component associated with land suitability, namely the social capital that
emerged as the outcome of cooperation. In the absence of migration, the countrys level of social
capital is captured by its natural land endowment. However, in the post-colonial era, where mass
migration has taken place, the level of social capital in each country reects the weighted average
of land suitability among its ancestral population. Hence, in order to capture this distinction, two
alternative empirical strategies are adopted. First, the measure of land suitability is adjusted to
capture the portable component of natural land endowment. The adjustment of the land suitability
index is based on the use of the migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010), which
provides estimates of the proportion of the ancestors in the year 1500 of one countrys population
today that were living within what are now the borders of that and each of the other countries.
Therefore a measure of adjusted land suitability is constructed using the weighted average of the
land suitability of the ancestral population of each country today. Second, the sample is restricted
to countries with a large percentage of native population, thereby implying that the social capital
that has been accumulated in the past, is still a prevalent norm among the native population.
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Specically, accounting for a variety of potentially confounding factors, the table demon-
strates the negative e¤ect of the log adjusted land suitability on the log of income per capita in the
year 2000.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 107 countries for which data on the full set of variables
used by the analysis are available, Column (1) reveals that, conditional on continental xed e¤ects,
adjusted land suitability possesses a statistically signicant negative relationship with income per
capita in the year 2000. Specically, the regression coe¢ cient implies that a 1% point increase in
adjusted land suitability is associated with a 0.18% decrease in income per capita in the year 2000.
Column (2) augments the current analysis with a number of geographical controls and
for the timing of the Neolithic Revolution. As is evident from the results, while some of these
factors do possess statistically signicant correlations with income per capita in the year 2000, the
persistent adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on development in the industrial stage remains
qualitatively robust, maintaining statistical signicance and increasing somewhat in magnitude under
these additional controls.
Column (3) reveals that, introducing into the analysis additional controls for ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, institutional controls and disease environment, further augments the point estimate
and statistical signicance associated with the coe¢ cient on adjusted land suitability, despite the
signicance of these controls in income per capita in the year 2000.
To ensure that the observed reversal in the impact of adjusted land suitability on economic
outcomes is not being driven by the institutional channels associated with European colonialism
(Acemoglu et al., 2005), the regression in Column (4) introduces controls for legal origins and colonial
dummies. Additionally it introduces controls for major religion shares. Reassuringly, the regression
coe¢ cient associated with the adjusted land suitability remains largely robust, showing that a 1%
point increase in adjusted land suitability is associated with a 0.26% decrease in income per capita
in the year 2000.
Column (5) is employing a measure of unadjusted land suitability and is restricting the sample
to 84 countries that have native population over 75% of the total population, while retaining all the
controls introduced in Column (4). Remarkably the results strongly support the hypothesis.36
The evidence presented in Table 2 therefore demonstrates, consistently with the theory, that
land suitability has had a persistent detrimental impact on economic development in the course
of industrialization, due to the reduced incentive it generated for cooperation in the agricultural
sector and ultimately the lower level of social capital that emerged as the outcome of the reduced
cooperation. The negative e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on economic outcomes in the year 2000
is depicted on the scatter plot in Figure (7).37 Figure (8) indicates the e¤ect of land suitability
36The threshold level of the native population is chosen in a way that minimizes the trade-o¤ between the reduced
observations and the fraction of the native people. Choosing a higher threshold would signicantly reduce the size
without qualitatively altering the results.
37One potential concern may be that the adverse e¤ect of land productivity on current economic outcomes is reecting
the e¤ect of the natural resource curse. Reassuringly though, the negative correlation between the index of land
productivity and income from natural resources as a fraction of GDP implies that the adverse e¤ect of land productivity
on contemporary economic outcomes does not capture the resource curse. Controlling though for OPEC countries, or
alternatively for natural resources as a fraction of GDP as an additional robustness check, does not qualitatively a¤ect
the results.
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Table 2: Land Suitability and Comparative Development in the Industrial Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Log Per Capita Income in 2000
Log Adjusted Land Suitability -0.189** -0.263*** -0.272*** -0.261***
(0:079) (0:078) (0:084) (0:098)
Log Land Suitability -0.211***
(0.0765)
Log Average Ruggedness -0.152 -0.0867 -0.0016 0.114
(0:156) (0:104) (0:119) (0.121)
Log Average Elevation 0.277 0.0616 -0.14 -0.194
(0:181) (0:121) (0:139) (0.150)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.182 -0.0973 0.0248 -0.106
( 0:127) ( 0:12) ( 0:158) (0.185)
Distance to Near Coast/River -0.422** -0.364* -0.223 -0.320**
(0:199) (0:185) (0:177) (0.160)
% Land within 100km of Water 0.603 0.0509 -0.22 -0.348
(0:414) (0:345) (0:373) (0.414)
Log Adj. Years Since Neolithic -0.221 0.0343 0.0304 -0.0635
(0:269) (0:201) (0:307) (0.271)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.846** -0.521 -0.597*
(0:360) (0:388) (0.322)
Polity IV 0.105*** 0.0626** 0.0772**
(0:025) (0:029) (0.0331)
% of Pop at Risk of Malaria -1.065*** -1.137** -1.180**
(0:334) (0:483) (0.460)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origin Dummies No No No Yes Yes
European Colony Dummy No No No Yes Yes
Major Religion Shares No No No Yes Yes
Native Population >0.75 No No No No Yes
Observations 107 107 107 107 84
R-squared 0.584 0.675 0.791 0.84 0.898
Summary: This table establishes the signicant negative e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on per capita
income in the year 2000 CE, while controlling for average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude,
access to navigable waterways, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
quality of institutions, disease environment, and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, legal origin,
European colony, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects. Column (5) restricts the sample to countries
with a fraction of native population higher than 75 percent and is employing a measure of land suitability
as opposed to adjusted land suitability, as an alternative approach to capture the portable component
of land suitability, namely the social capital being the outcome of cooperation in the agricultural sector.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential
evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and
soil pH; (ii) The measure for adjusted land suitability is adjusting the land suitability index, based on the use of
the migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010) which provides estimates of the proportion of the
ancestors in 1500 of one countrys population today that were living within what are now the borders of that and
each of the other countries. (iii) the set of continent dummies in Columns (1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa,
Australia, Europe, North America, South America and Oceania; (iv) the set of legal origins dummies in columns
(4)-(6) includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist
origin; (v) the set of major religion shares dummies in columns (4)-(6) includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share,
Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (vi) the set of European colony dummies in columns (4)-
(6) includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Portuguese colony, Spanish colony and other European
colony; (vii) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (viii) *** denotes statistical signicance at
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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on current economic outcomes for the restricted sample of countries, having a fraction of native
population higher than 75%.
Figure 7: Land Suitability and Economic Outcomes in the Year 2000
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Figure 8: Land Suitability and Economic Outcomes in the Year 2000-Restricted Sample
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6.2.2 The Impact of Land Suitability on Trust in the Industrial Stage
Consistently with the predictions of the theory, Table 3 establishes that countries with unfavorable
land endowment manifest higher levels of social capital and trust today. Importantly, since the
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portable component associated with land suitability, namely the social capital that emerged as the
outcome of cooperation, a¤ects the current level of trust, the measure of land suitability is adjusted to
capture the portable component of natural land endowment, namely social capital, using the weighted
average of the land suitability of the ancestral population of each country today (Putterman and
Weil, 2010). In particular, the analysis reveals a statistically signicant and robust negative e¤ect of
the log adjusted land suitability on the index of trust.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 57 countries for which data on the full set of variables
used by the analysis are available, Column (1) reveals that, conditional on continental xed e¤ects,
adjusted land suitability possesses a statistically signicant negative relationship with trust.
Column (2) augments the current analysis with a number of exogenous geographical controls
as well as with a control for the timing of the Neolithic Revolution. As is evident from the
results, the persistent adverse e¤ect of land suitability on trust in the industrial stage remains
qualitatively robust, maintaining statistical signicance and increasing somewhat in magnitude under
these additional controls.
Column (3) further arguments the analysis by introducing additional controls for ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, institutional controls and disease environment. A greater degree of
fractionalization could be detrimental for trust whereas better institutions may be associated with
more trust (Putnam, 2007). Nevertheless, even after controlling for these additional channels the
coe¢ cient remains largely intact.
To ensure that the observed impact of land suitability on trust is not being driven by the
institutional channels associated with European colonialism, the regression in Column (4) introduces
controls for legal origins, colonial dummies as well as dummies for major religion shares. Even
after controlling for all this additional channels, the regression coe¢ cient associated with the land
suitability remains largely robust.
Whereas adjusted land suitability is the appropriate measure, Column (5) conducts a robust-
ness check by using the measure of log land suitability and restricting the sample to the countries
that have a percentage of native population higher than 75%, thereby implying that the norms of
social capital and trust are still prevalent among the native population. While the coe¢ cient drops
slightly in magnitude, its statistical signicance remains una¤ected.
Reassuringly, similar results, that establish a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of
land productivity on current levels of social capital are obtained, when employing an alternative
proxy of social capital, namely the extend of participation in civic activities, as dened by La Porta
et al. (1997) and indicated in Column (6).
The evidence presented in Table 3 therefore demonstrates, consistently with the theory, that
indeed the land suitability has had a persistent detrimental impact on current levels of trust, due to
the reduced incentive it generated for cooperation in the agricultural sector and ultimately the lower
level of social capital that emerged and persisted as the outcome of the reduced cooperation. The
negative e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on the generalized level of trust is depicted on the scatter
plot in Figure (14). Figure (15) illustrates the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the current levels
of trust, for the restricted sample of countries with a fraction of the native population higher than
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Table 3: Adjusted Land Suitability and Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var.: Trust Dep. Var.: Civic
Participation
Log Adjusted Land Suitability -0.0909*** -0.100*** -0.0966*** -0.0656** -0.0535**
(0.0173) (0.0200) (0.0220) (0.0242) (0.0134)
Log Land Suitability -0.0540***
(0.0165)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.00677 0.00649 -0.0313 -0.0312 -0.00460
(0.0427) (0.0422) (0.0356) (0.0403) (0.0264)
Log Average Elevation -0.0132 -0.0130 -0.000261 -0.0137 -0.0441
(0.0716) (0.0697) (0.0472) (0.0488) (0.0302)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.00193 -0.0345 0.109** 0.0838 0.0468
(0.0283) (0.0442) (0.0404) (0.0558) (0.246)
Distance to Near Coast/River -0.0895** -0.0848** -0.0220 -0.0290 -0.0418
(0.0345) (0.0334) (0.0407) (0.0487) (0.0310)
% Land within 100km of Water -0.0120 -0.0324 0.0111 0.00714 -0.0481
(0.108) (0.108) (0.0878) (0.109) (0.0647)
Log Adj. Years Since Neolithic -0.0506 -0.0585 0.232** 0.209* 0.207**
(0.0745) (0.0781) (0.101) (0.121) (0.0612)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.101 0.0850 0.217 0.0757
(0.104) (0.110) (0.139) (0.0495)
Polity IV 0.00267 -0.0154* -0.0138* 0.00870
(0.00520) (0.00754) (0.00792) (0.00641)
% of Pop at Risk of Malaria -0.0658 0.172 0.0706 -8.575
(0.114) (0.120) (0.122) (5.515)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origin Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
European Colony Dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes
Major Religion Shares No No No Yes Yes Yes
Native Population >0.75 No No No No Yes No
Observations 57 57 57 57 49 24
R-squared 0.415 0.514 0.537 0.788 0.818 0.985
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on per the current
level of generalized trust, while controlling for average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude, access
to navigable waterways, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, quality
of institutions, disease environment, and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, legal origin, European
colony, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects. Column (5) restricts the sample to countries with a
fraction of native population higher than 75 percent and is employing a measure of land productivity
as opposed to adjusted land suitability, as an alternative approach to capture the portable component of
land productivity, namely the social capital being the outcome of cooperation in the agricultural sector.
Column (6) employs an alternative measure of social capital namely the extent of civic participation.
Notes: (i) Data on trust come from ve di¤erent waves of the World Values Survey (1981-2008) and they are built
upon the fraction of total respondents within a given country, based on their answers on the question "Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people";
(ii) civic participation measures the extent of participation in civic activities (La Porta et al., 1997); (iii) log land
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate
suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well
as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (iv) The measure for
adjusted land suitability is adjusting the land suitability index, based on the use of the migration matrix constructed
by Putterman and Weil (2010) which provides estimates of the proportion of the ancestors in 1500 of one countrys
population today that were living within what are now the borders of that and each of the other countries. (v) the set
of continent dummies in Columns (1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Australia, Europe, North America, South
America and Oceania; (vi) the set of legal origins dummies in columns (4)-(6) includes a xed e¤ect for British legal
origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares
dummies in columns (4)-(6) includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other
religious shares; (viii) the set of European colony dummies in columns (4)-(6) includes a xed e¤ect for British colony,
French colony, Portuguese colony, Spanish colony and other European colony; (ix) robust standard error estimates
are reported in parentheses; (x) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Figure 14: Adjusted Land Suitability and Trust
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Figure 15: Land Suitability and Trust-Restricted Sample
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38One concern that may arise is that land productivity is correlated with the degree of land inequality and high land
inequality may generate conict and therefore hinder cooperation and ultimately trust. To address this concern, one
could capture this channel by controlling for land inequality. Reassuringly, as established in Appendix C, controlling for
land inequality does not a¤ect the qualitative results. In addition, the coe¢ cient of land inequality is positive thereby
implying that if indeed conict emerges, it is not the dominating e¤ect. In particular, it is plausibly suggested by the
positive coe¢ cient, that unequal land productivity fostered cooperation and trade among regions, generating positive
e¤ects on economic outcomes in the past and the present as well as on the current levels of trust.
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6.2.3 The Impact of Land Productivity on Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage
The evidence presented so far establishes a reversal of fortune in the process of economic development
with respect to natural land endowment. Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 establish that this reversal operates
through the cooperation developed in the agricultural sector in an e¤ort to mitigate the adverse
e¤ect of land. Cooperation, as reected by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places
were land was not highly productive and collective action could diminish the adverse e¤ects of the
environment and enhance agricultural output.39
In the absence of extensive cross-country data on irrigation prior to industrialization, the
analysis is based on the fraction of irrigated land for a sample of non-industrial countries in the
year 1900. The exclusion of industrialized countries is based upon membership in the OECD in
the year 1985, under the assumption that membership was restricted to advanced, and thus early
industrialized countries. In the light of the fact that industrialized countries are more advanced
technologically, the restriction of the sample is aimed to eliminate the possibility that the extent
of irrigation is capturing the stage of development as opposed to the trade-o¤s associated with the
development of infrastructure.
Consistently with the predictions of the theory, Table 4 establishes that countries with
unfavorable land endowment had an increased incentive to invest in agricultural infrastructure as
a means to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land. In particular, the analysis reveals a statistically
signicant and robust negative e¤ect of the log land suitability on the fraction of irrigated land in
the year 1900.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 72 countries for which data on the full set of variables
used by the analysis are available, Column (1) in Table 4 reports a statistically signicant e¤ect, at
the 5% level, of land suitability on the fraction of irrigated land, while controlling only for continental
xed e¤ects.
Column (2) enriches the analysis with a number of exogenous geographical controls, namely
absolute latitude, access to waterways, average ruggedness, average elevation as well as dummies for
landlocked countries and islands, all of which are crucial factors for the development of irrigation
systems. Despite the statistical signicance of the geographical controls, and particularly of controls
that are associated with access to waterways, the analysis establishes a statistically signicant
negative e¤ect of land suitability on the development of irrigation in the year 1900.
Column (3) controls for the timing of the Neolithic Revolution that could have positively
a¤ected the emergence of more extensive irrigation infrastructure. Nevertheless the coe¢ cient
remains largely intact and statistically signicant.
Column (4) is controlling for the distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year
1500, which is a crucial channel since it would imply that more sophisticated irrigation methods
39 If coordination problems among members of the community dictate a suboptimal level of investment in
infrastructure, the qualitative results would be enhanced. Since the complexity of coordination increases with the
size of the community, less favorably endowed places, and therefore more sparsely populated places (according to the
Malthusian mechanism) would coordinate more easily than more densely populated places. Hence, the sub-optimally
level of investment in infrastructure will be larger in favorably endowed places, enhancing the hypothesis the less
favorably endowed places invest more in infrastructure.
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Table 4: Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage-Irrigation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Irrigation in 1900
Log Land Suitability -0.283** -0.448*** -0.430*** -0.439*** -0.483***
(0.141) (0.123) (0.112) (0.109) (0.151)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.329 0.472 0.494 0.226
(0.317) (0.337) (0.331) (0.402)
Log Average Elevation 0.574* 0.517 0.429 0.862**
(0.308) (0.326) (0.324) (0.401)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.216 0.200 0.142 0.456
(0.189) (0.198) (0.202) (0.499)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.482 -0.260 -0.320 -0.0499
(0.369) (0.391) (0.410) (0.551)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 2.615*** 2.907*** 2.746** 4.312***
(0.969) (1.034) (1.056) (1.464)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.965 0.622 0.912
(0.672) (0.722) (0.949)
Distance to Frontier in 1500 -0.154 -0.0533
(0.0945) (0.120)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Native Population >0.75 No No No No Yes
Observations 72 72 72 72 44
R-squared 0.461 0.672 0.688 0.697 0.758
Summary This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on cooperation, as proxied by the
fraction of irrigated land in the year 1900, while controlling for average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute
latitude, access to navigable waterways, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technolog-
ical frontier in the year 1500, and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed
e¤ects. The statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient in Column (5), which restricts the sample to a subset of
countries with a fraction of native population higher than 75%, ensures that it is the adverse e¤ect of land that is
positively a¤ecting cooperation in the year 1900 and not the specic human capital of the migrant population.
Notes: (i) The dataset excludes countries that were not a member of the OECD in 1985, in an attempt to
exclude the countries that had already industrialized in 1900; (ii) data on irrigation are reported by Freydank
and Siebert (2008), who have constructed a set of annual values of area equipped for irrigation for all 236
countries during the time period 1900 - 2003. The irrigation variable is using the data for the year 1900 CE
and is expressed as the ratio of irrigated land over arable land; (iii) log land suitability is a geospatial index of
the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such
as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators
of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (iv) the set of continent dummies in
Columns (1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe. An Oceania dummy is not
included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression samples, restricted by the
availability of income per capita data; (v) a single continent dummy is used to represent the Americas, which in
natural given the historical period examined; (vi) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses;
(vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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could be developed. Nevertheless the coe¢ cient of land suitability remains highly signicant and
intact.
Given that in the year 1900 mass migration has already taken place in a number of countries, a
potential concern would be that irrigation is a¤ected by some sort of specic human capital carried by
the migrants, which could reduce the opportunity cost associated with the development of irrigation.
Hence in order to capture this aspect, Column (5) is restricting the sample to countries with a
percentage of native population higher than 75%, thereby implying that migration has not a¤ected
the composition of the human capital of the native population. It is established that the adverse
e¤ect of land suitability on the development of irrigation in the year 1900, remains intact, with the
coe¢ cient increasing in magnitude and implying that a 1% increase in land suitability would be
associated with a 0.48% decrease in the fraction of irrigated land.
The evidence presented in table 4, is thereby establishing the adverse e¤ect of land suitability
on the emergence of irrigation. The negative e¤ect of land suitability on the fraction of irrigated
land in the year 1900 is illustrated on the scatter plot in Figure (9). Figure (10) indicates the same
e¤ect for the restricted sample of countries with a fraction of the native population higher than 75%.
Figure 9: Land Suitability and Irrigation in the Year 1900
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Figure 10: Land Productivity and Irrigation in the Year 1900-Restricted Sample
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In the absence of more extensive data on agricultural infrastructure in antiquity, the adverse
e¤ect of natural land productivity on cooperation in earlier periods is examined based on several
proxies of cooperation: a) communication in the year 1 CE, b) transportation in the year 1 CE,
and c) medium of exchange in the year 1 CE. According to the theory, sophisticated means of
communication, transportation and medium of exchange have been catalysts in the advancement of
large-scale cooperation, and thus, under-development of these technologies reects the adverse e¤ect
of land suitability on the extent of cooperation.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 142 countries for which data on the full set of variables
used by the analysis are available, Column (1) in Table 5 establishes, conditional on continental xed
e¤ects, a statistically signicant negative e¤ect of land suitability on the development of sophisticated
means of communication in the year 1.
It could be argued that the advancement of communication technology captures the degree
of trade, associated with higher land suitability, as opposed to the emergence of cooperation in an
environment characterized by lower land suitability. Reassuringly however, a more suitable land for
agriculture in these societies had an adverse e¤ect on the technological level of this sector, suggesting
that the dominating e¤ect was indeed that of reduced cooperation. Moreover, to control for this
channel, Column (2) controls for inequality in the land suitability for agriculture, a more direct
proxy for trade in early stages of development. Reassuringly, the adverse e¤ect of land suitability
on the development of these technologies remains signicant, despite the positive and statistically
signicant e¤ect of land inequality on cooperation technology.
Column (3) enriches the analysis with additional geographical controls. Whereas the con-
trolled factors do possess statistically signicant correlations with the development of means of
communication in the year 1, the persistent e¤ect of land suitability in the development of means of
communication remains statistically signicant. Column (4) controls for the timing of the Neolithic
Revolution that is attested to have a¤ected the emergence of more developed communication means.
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Table 5: Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage-Communication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Communication in the Year 1
Log Land Suitability -0.0899*** -0.0674*** -0.0775*** -0.0729*** -0.0708***
(0:023) (0:024) (0:026) (0:025) (0:025)
Log Land Suitability Gini 0.0679 0.115* 0.112* 0.123*
(0:052) (0:067) (0:065) (0:064)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.0623 0.0844* 0.076
(0:050) (0:050) (0:048)
Log Average Elevation 0.00125 -0.0346 -0.0377
(0:051) (0:050) (0:046)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.0663 0.0991* 0.0853*
(0:056) (0:051) (0:051)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River 0.0132 0.0257 0.0311
(0:107) (0:099) (0:097)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.297 0.262 0.26
(0:197) (0:191) (0:188)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.322*** 0.247**
(0:093) (0:097)
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1 -0.0584***
(0:020)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142 142 142 142 142
R-squared 0.268 0.276 0.338 0.386 0.401
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on cooperation, as
proxied by the means of communication in the year 1, while controlling for log land suitability
Gini, average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways,
years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year
1, and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual
to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as
soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) data on communication in the year 1 are constructed from Peregrines
(2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and aggregated at the country level by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). The
measure is reported on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various anthropological and historical sources; (iii)
the land suitability Gini coe¢ cient is based on the distribution of a land suitability index, reported at a half-
degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002), across grid cells within a country; (iv) the set of continent
dummies in Columns (1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. An
Oceania dummy is not included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression
samples, restricted by the availability of income per capita data; (v) a single continent dummy is used to
represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (vi) robust standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at
the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Nevertheless the coe¢ cient remains largely intact and statistically signicant. Column (5) controls
for the distance from the nearest technological frontier, however the coe¢ cient remains remarkably
stable.
The evidence presented in Table 5, is thereby establishing the detrimental e¤ect of land suit-
ability on the emergence of more sophisticated technology of communication during the agricultural
stage of development. The positive e¤ect of land suitability on communication in the year 1 is
depicted on the scatter plot in Figure (11).
Figure 11: Land Suitability and Communication in the Year 1
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Employing a 142 cross country sample, Column (1) in table 6 establishes, conditional on con-
tinental xed e¤ects, a statistically signicant negative e¤ect of land suitability on the development
of more advanced transportation technology in the year 1.
The concern that the advancement of transportation technology captures the degree of
trade, associated with higher land suitability, is more pronounced in the case of transportation.
Reassuringly however, a more suitable land for agriculture in these societies had an adverse e¤ect on
the technological level of this sector, suggesting that the dominating e¤ect was indeed that of reduced
cooperation. Moreover, to control for this channel, Column (2) controls for inequality in the land
suitability for agriculture, as a proxy for trade. Reassuringly, the adverse e¤ect of land suitability
on the development of these technologies remains signicant, despite the positive and statistically
signicant e¤ect of land inequality on the emergence of transportation technology.
Column (3) further augments the analysis with additional geographical controls. Despite
the statistical signicance of the additional controls, the persistent e¤ect of land suitability in the
development of transportation technology remains statistically signicant and largely una¤ected.
Column (4) enriches the analysis by controlling for the timing of the Neolithic Revolution however
the coe¢ cient remains intact. Column (5) establishes similar results even after controlling for the
distance from the nearest technological frontier.
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Table 6: Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage-Transportation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Transportation in the Year 1
Log Land Suitability -0.0686*** -0.0340* -0.0412** -0.0375** -0.0363**
(0:017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0:017)
Log Land Suitability Gini 0.105*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.137***
(0.030) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.0272 0.0447 0.04
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
Log Average Elevation 0.00197 -0.0265 -0.0282
(0.033) (0.032) (0.029)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.0255 0.0516 0.0439
(0.042) (0.039) (0.039)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.0181 -0.00815 -0.00512
(0.077) (0.071) (0.069)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.147 0.119 0.118
(0.103) (0.097) (0.096)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.256*** 0.213***
(0.063) (0.066)
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1 -0.0327**
(0.013)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142 142 142 142 142
R-squared 0.671 0.694 0.708 0.744 0.75
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on cooperation,
as proxied by the means of transportation in the year 1, while controlling for log land suitability
Gini, average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways,
years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year
1, and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual
to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as
soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) data on transportation in the year 1 are constructed from Peregrines
(2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and aggregated at the country level by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). The
measure is reported on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various anthropological and historical sources; (iii)
the land suitability Gini coe¢ cient is based on the distribution of a land suitability index, reported at a half-
degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002), across grid cells within a country; (iv) the set of continent
dummies in Columns (1)-(4) include a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. An
Oceania dummy is not included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression
samples, restricted by the availability of income per capita data ; (v) a single continent dummy is used to
represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (vi) robust standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at
the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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The evidence presented in table 6, is thereby establishing the detrimental e¤ect of land
productivity on the emergence of more advanced transportation technology during the agricultural
stage of development. The positive e¤ect of land suitability on transportation in the year 1 is depicted
on the scatter plot in Figure (12).
Figure 12: Land Suitability and Transportation in the Year 1
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Employing a 142 cross country sample, Column (1) in Table 7 establishes, conditional on con-
tinental xed e¤ects, a statistically signicant negative e¤ect of land suitability on the development
of advanced medium of exchange in the year 1.
Similarly to the case of transportation technology, the concern that the advancement of the
medium of exchange captures the degree of trade, associated with higher land suitability, is more
pronounced. Reassuringly however, a more suitable land for agriculture in these societies had an
adverse e¤ect on the medium of exchange, suggesting that the dominating e¤ect was indeed that of
reduced cooperation. Moreover, to control for the trade channel, Column (2) controls for inequality
in the land suitability for agriculture. Reassuringly, the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the
development of a medium of exchange remains signicant, despite the positive and statistically
signicant coe¢ cient of land inequality.
Column (3) further augments the analysis with additional geographical controls, reassuringly
though the coe¢ cient of land suitability remains intact. Column (4) controls for the timing of the
Neolithic Revolution, whereas Column (5) controls for the distance from the nearest technological
frontier. In both cases and whereas the controlled factors do possess statistically signicant cor-
relations with the development of medium of exchange in the year 1, the persistent e¤ect of land
suitability in the development of medium of exchange remains statistically signicant.
The evidence presented in Table 7, is thereby establishing the detrimental e¤ect of land
productivity on the emergence of more sophisticated medium of exchange during the agricultural
stage of development. The positive e¤ect of land suitability on the medium of exchange in the year
1 is depicted on the scatter plot in Figure (13).
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Table 7: Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage-Medium of Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var.: Medium of Exchange in the Year 1
Log Land Suitability -0.0777*** -0.0377* -0.0529** -0.0490** -0.0473**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Log Land Suitability Gini 0.0969*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.158***
(0.037) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.0792* 0.0978** 0.0909**
(0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
Log Average Elevation -0.0434 -0.0736* -0.0762**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.0169 0.0446 0.0332
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.0563 -0.0457 -0.0413
(0.091) (0.085) (0.083)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.0983 0.0686 0.0671
(0.142) (0.138) (0.137)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.271*** 0.209***
(0.072) (0.078)
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1 -0.0481***
(0.0173)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 142 142 142 142 142
R-squared 0.491 0.523 0.546 0.583 0.594
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on cooperation,
as proxied by the medium of exchange in the year 1, while controlling for log land suitability
Gini, average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways,
years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year
1, and xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual
to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil
carbon density and soil pH; (ii) data on medium of exchange in year 1000 are constructed from Peregrines
(2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and aggregated at the country level by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). The
measure is reported on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various anthropological and historical sources; (iii)
the land suitability Gini coe¢ cient is based on the distribution of a land suitability index, reported at a half-
degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002), across grid cells within a country; (iv) the set of continent
dummies in Columns (1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. An
Oceania dummy is not included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression
samples, restricted by the availability of income per capita data; (v) a single continent dummy is used to
represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (vi) robust standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at
the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Figure 13: Land Suitability and Medium of Exchange in the Year 1
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Reassuringly, as is evident from Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7, there is a statistically signicant
adverse e¤ect of land suitability on a number of proxies for cooperation during the agricultural
stage of development, namely a) fraction of irrigated land in the year 1900, b) communication in
the year 1, c) transportation in the year 1, d) medium of exchange in the year 1. The measure for
irrigation is a direct measure of cooperation in the agricultural stage of development, whereas the
alternative measures can be viewed as by-products of cooperation in the development of agricultural
infrastructure.40
7 Concluding Remarks
This research argues that reversal of fortune in the process of economic development can be traced to
the e¤ect of natural land endowment on the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector.
In early stages of development, unfavorable land endowment enhanced the economic incentive for
cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of
the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the benecial e¤ects of cooperation on the intensive
margin of agriculture, low natural land productivity countries lagged behind during the agricultural
stage of development. However, as cooperation, and its persistent e¤ect on social capital, have become
increasingly important in the process of urbanization and industrialization, the transition from
agriculture to industry among unfavorable land endowment economies was expedited, permitting
40One could potentially argue that threat of war and the fear of being invaded could enforce cooperation in the
past. However, the presence of this plausible e¤ect would suggest that the identied adverse e¤ect of land productivity
on cooperation represents an upper bound of the actual e¤ect. First, if one plausibly assumes that the more fertile
places faced an increased risk to be invaded then land productivity would generate a positive e¤ect on cooperation via
this channel, mitigating the actual adverse e¤ect identied in the regression analysis. Moreover, even if implausibly,
less fertile places were faced with an increased probability of being invaded, it would only constitute a complementary
channel through which land productivity is a¤ecting cooperation and trust, since as the established e¤ect of low land
productivity on cooperation, via irrigation, medium of exchange, and communication technologies are tangential to
cooperation for defensive purposes.
52
those economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage of development, to overtake the high
land productivity economies in the industrial stage of development.
The fundamental hypothesis of this research originates from the realization that the evolution
of the wealth of nations has been driven in part by the trade-o¤ between natural land productivity
and the level of cooperation and social capital, in di¤erent stages of development. Social capital
emerged initially as the outcome of cooperation in the agricultural sector, in an e¤ort to further
enhance land productivity. While cooperation in the agricultural sector had direct benecial e¤ect
on agricultural productivity, via the development of agricultural infrastructure, its indirect e¤ect on
the emergence of social capital accelerated the transition to the industrial stage of development.
Variations in natural land productivity and their e¤ect on the emergence of agricultural
infrastructure and cooperation had therefore a profound e¤ect on the di¤erential pattern of devel-
opment across the globe. Interestingly, investment in infrastructure that has been widely advocated
as a growth boosting strategy for developing countries spontaneously emerged centuries earlier in an
e¤ort to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of natural environment. Unfortunately, however, the benecial
externalities that were associated with these activities in the past are no longer present.
In accordance with the predictions of the theory, empirical evidence suggests that, accounting
for a wide variety of potentially confounding factors, (i) a reversal of fortune in the process of
development can be traced to variation in land suitability for agriculture across countries. Economies
characterized by favorable land endowment dominated the world economy in the agricultural stage
of development but were overtaken in the process of industrialization; (ii) cooperation, as reected
by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places were land was not highly productive
and collective action could diminish the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance agricultural
output; (iii) lower level of land suitability in the past is associated with higher levels of contemporary
social capital.
Interestingly, the proposed mechanism could also capture the emergence of risk mitigating
social networks in remote and harsh climatic environments and thus potentially the forces behind
the emergence of the welfare state. The advent of the welfare state in the region of Scandinavia,
for instance, could be partly traced to the long lasting e¤ects of this form of cooperation, that had
characterized this region in the past.
53
Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 8. Under AIt < = (1  ), the Jacobian matrix of the conditional dynamical
system, comprised of (17) and (18), is given by
J
 
AAt ; Lt

=
264 @A
A
t+1=@A
A
t @A
A
t+1=@Lt
@Lt+1=@A
A
t @Lt+1=@Lt
375
=
264  + b(Lt)
(AAt )
b 1 (Lt) 1(AAt )b
1 
 a
a(1  a)(1 a)2 a 1  aa(1  a)(1 a) a
375 , (A.1)
which, when evaluated at the conditional steady state given by (23) and (24), yields
J
 
AAss; Lss

=
26664
 + b(1  )  1
(1 )
b
1 b

 (1 )aa(1 a)1 a a(1 )
1
1 b
(1 )aa(1 a)1 a2 a

1 
 a
a(1  a)(1 a)2 a 1  aa(1  a)(1 a) a
37775  Jss.
(A.2)
To ensure that the system has two positive eigenvalues, it must be established that:
Det (Jss) > 0; and
Tr (Jss) > 0;8 2 (0; 1) :
From (A.2) it follows that forDet (Jss) > 0,  <  <
"
(1 )v

[(1 )
b
1 b+b(1 )
1
1 b+(1 )
1
(1 b) ]

#1=a
is
a su¢ cient condition. In addition it is clear from (A.2), that Tr (Jss) > 0;8 2 (0; 1) :
Given so far that the discrete dynamical system has two positive eigenvalues, it is clear
from the phase diagram in Figure 2, that
 
AAss; Lss

is a locally asymptotically stable node of the
conditional dynamical system for any ; and convergence takes places monotonically 
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B Variable Denitions and Sources
Outcome Variables
Population Density in the Year 1, 1000, and 1500. Population density (in persons per square km)
for given year is calculated as population in that year, as reported by McEvedy and Jones (1978), divided
by total land area as reported by the World Banks World Development Indicators. The cross-sectional unit
of observation in McEvedy and Jones(1978) data set is a region delineated by its international borders in
1975. Historical population estimates are provided for regions corresponding to either individual countries
or, in some cases, to sets comprised of 23 neighboring countries (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). In
the latter case, a set-specic population density gure is calculated based on total land area and the gure
is then assigned to each of the component countries in the set. The same methodology is also employed to
obtain population density for countries that exist today but were part of a larger political unit (e.g., the former
Yugoslavia) in 1975.
Income Per Capita in 2000. Real GDP per capita, in constant 2000 international dollars, as reported by
the World Banks World Development Indicators.
Irrigation in 1900. Data on irrigation are reported by Freydank and Siebert (2008). They have constructed
a set of annual values of area equipped for irrigation for all 236 countries during the time period 1900 - 2003.
The values are provided in 1000 ha units. The Irrigation variable is using the data for the year 1900 and is
expressed as the ln of the ratio of irrigated land over arable land.
Communication in Year 1, Transportation in Year 1, Medium of Exchange in Year 1.
Data on a) Communication in the year 1 b) Transportation in the year 1 c) Medium of Exchange in the year
,1 are constructed from Peregrines (2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and aggregated at the country level by
Ashraf and Galor (2011a). Each of these three sectors is reported on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various
anthropological and historical sources. The level of technology in each sector is indexed as follows. In the
communications sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence of both true writing and mnemonic
or non-written records, a value of 1 under the presence of only mnemonic or non-written records, and a value of
2 under the presence of both. In the transportation sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence
of both vehicles and pack or draft animals, a value of 1 under the presence of only pack or draft animals, and
a value of 2 under the presence of both. In the Medium of Exchange sector, the index is assigned a value
of 0 under the absence of domestically used articles and currency, a value of one under the presence of only
domestically used articles and the value of 2 under the presence of both. In all cases, the sector-specic indices
are normalized to assume values in the [0; 1]-interval. Given that the cross-sectional unit of observation in
Peregrines dataset is an archaeological tradition or culture, specic to a given region on the global map, and
since spatial delineations in Peregrines dataset do not necessarily correspond to contemporary international
borders, the culture-specic technology index in a given year is aggregated to the country level by averaging
across those cultures from Peregrines map that appear within the modern borders of a given country.
Mean Generalized Trust. The fraction of World Values Survey (WVS) respondents that agreed with the
statement most people can be trusted.
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Geographical Variables
Land Suitability. A geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators
of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapo-
transpiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and
soil pH. This index was initially reported at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002). Formally,
Ramankutty et al. (2002) calculate the land suitability index (S) as the product of climate suitability (Sclim)
and soil suitability (Ssoil), i.e., S = Sclim Ssoil. The climate suitability component is estimated to be a function
of growing degree days (GDD) and a moisture index () gauging water availability to plants, calculated as the
ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, i.e., Sclim = f1(GDD)f2(). The soil suitability component,
on the other hand, is estimated to be a function of soil carbon density (Csoil) and soil pH (pHsoil), i.e. Ssoil
= g1(Csoil)g2(pHsoil). The functions, f1(GDD), f2(), g1(Csoil), and g2(pHsoil) are chosen by Ramankutty
et al. (2002) by empirically tting functions to the observed relationships between cropland areas, GDD, ,
Csoil, and pHsoil. For more details on the specic functional forms chosen, the interested reader is referred to
Ramankutty et al. (2002). Since Ramankutty et al. (2002) report the land suitability index at a half-degree
resolution, Michalopoulos (2011) aggregates the index to the country level by averaging land suitability across
grid cells within a country. This study employs the country-level aggregate measure reported by Michalopoulos
(2011) as the control for land suitability in the baseline regression specications for both historical population
density and contemporary income per capita.
Land Suitability (Adjusted). The cross-country weighted average of the land suitability measure. The
weight associated with a given country in the calculation represents the fraction of the year 2000 population
(of the country for which the measure is being computed) that can trace its ancestral origins to the given
country in the year 1500 . The ancestry weights are obtained from the World Migration Matrix (15002000)
of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Land Suitability Gini. The land suitability Gini coe¢ cient is based on the distribution of a land suitability
index, reported at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002), across grid cells within a country.
This variable is obtained from the data set of Michalopoulos (2011).
Land Suitability Gini (Adjusted). The cross-country weighted average of the land suitability Gini measure.
The weight associated with a given country in the calculation represents the fraction of the year 2000 population
(of the country for which the measure is being computed) that can trace its ancestral origins to the given
country in the year 1500 . The ancestry weights are obtained from the World Migration Matrix (15002000)
of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Percentage of Arable Land. The percentage of a countrys total land area that is arable as reported by
the World Banks World Development Indicators.
Total Land Area. The total land area of a country in millions of square km as reported by the World Banks
World Development Indicators.
Absolute Latitude. The absolute value of the latitude of a countrys approximate geodesic centroid as
reported by the CIAs World Factbook.
Percentage of Land within 100 km of Waterway. The percentage of a countrys total land area that is
located within 100 km of an ice-free coastline or sea-navigable river. This variable was originally constructed
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by Gallup et al. (1999) and is part of Harvard Universitys CID Research Datasets on General Measures of
Geography available online.
Average Elevation. The average elevation of a country in thousands of km above sea level, calculated using
geospatial elevation data reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006) at a 1-degree resolution. The
measure is thus the average elevation across the grid cells within a country.
Average Ruggedness. The measure is the average degree of ruggedness across the grid cells within a country,
calculated using geospatial elevation data reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006) at a 1-degree
resolution. This variable is obtained from the data set of Michalopoulos (2011).
Small Island and Landlocked Dummy. 0/1-indicators for whether or not a country is a small island
nation, and whether or not it possesses a coastline. These variables are constructed by Ashraf and Galor
(2011a) based on information reported by the CIA in The World Factbook online resource.
Percentage of Population at Risk of Malaria. A geographically-based index gauging the extent of
malaria endemicity as reported by Kiszewski et al. (2004).
Distance Variables
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1, 1000 and 1500.: The distance, in thousands of kilometers, from
a countrys modern capital city to the closest regional technological frontier in the year 1500, as reported
by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). Specically, the authors employ historical urbanization estimates from Tertius
Chandler (1987) and George Modelski (2003) to identify frontiers based on the size of urban populations,
selecting the two largest cities from each continent that belong to di¤erent sociopolitical entities.
Years since Neolithic Revolution. The number of thousand years elapsed, until the year 2000, since the
majority of the population residing within a countrys modern national borders began practicing sedentary
agriculture as the primary mode of subsistence. This measure, reported by Putterman (2008), is compiled using
a wide variety of both regional and country-specic archaeological studies as well as more general encyclopedic
works on the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture during the Neolithic.
Years since Neolithic Revolution (Adjusted). The cross-country weighted average of the timing of the
Neolithic Revolution. The weight associated with a given country in the calculation represents the fraction of
the year 2000 population (of the country for which the measure is being computed) that can trace its ancestral
origins to the given country in the year 1500 . The ancestry weights are obtained from the World Migration
Matrix, 15002000, of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Institutional Variables
Ethnic Fractionalization. A fractionalization index, constructed by Alesina et al. (2003), that captures
the probability that two individuals, selected at random from a countrys population, will belong to di¤erent
ethnic groups.
Polity IV. The 19602000 mean of an index that quanties the extent of institutionalized democracy, as
reported in the Polity IV data set. The Polity IV democracy index for a given year is an 11-point categorical
variable (from 0 to 10) that is additively derived from Polity IV codings on the (i) competitiveness of political
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participation, (ii) openness of executive recruitment, (iii) competitiveness of executive recruitment, and (iv)
constraints on the chief executive.
Legal Origins. A set of dummy variables, reported by La Porta et al. (1999), that identies the legal origin
of the Company Law or Commercial Code of a country. The ve legal origin possibilities are: (i) English
Common Law, (ii) French Commercial Code, (iii) German Commercial Code, (iv) Scandinavian Commercial
Code, and (v) Socialist or Communist Laws.
European Colony. An indicator for whether or not a country was colonized by a European nation as coded
by Acemoglu et al. (2005). The variable equals 1 for colonized countries.
Major Religion Shares. A set of variables, from La Porta et al. (1999), that identies the percentage of a
countrys population belonging to the three most widely spread religions of the world. The religions identied
are: (i) Roman Catholic, (ii) Protestant, (iii) Muslim, and iv) Other.
Percentage of Native Population. The variable of the percentage of native population is constructed by
(Ashraf and Galor, 2011a), based on the migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010).
58
C Descriptive Statistics and Additional Empirical Results
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Table C.8: Impact of Land Suitability on Population Density in the Year 1000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Log Population Density in the Year 1000
Log Land Suitability 0.479*** 0.369*** 0.403*** 0.414***
(0.0825) (0.0683) (0.0586) (0.0574)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.221 0.298** 0.277**
(0.138) (0.127) (0.122)
Log Average Elevation -0.113 -0.263** -0.233**
(0.127) (0.125) (0.116)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.432** -0.277* -0.326**
(0.188) (0.156) (0.157)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.529** -0.471** -0.395**
(0.234) (0.194) (0.196)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.432 0.341 0.467
(0.409) (0.383) (0.393)
Log Years Since Neolithic 1.424*** 1.166***
(0.234) (0.257)
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1000 -0.200***
(0.0730)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143 143 143 143
R-squared 0.439 0.579 0.675 0.688
Summary: This table establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of land suitability on
population density in the year 1000, while controlling for average ruggedness, average
elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year 1000 and
xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based
on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the
ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for
cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) the set of continent dummies in Columns
(1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. An Oceania dummy is
not included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression samples,
restricted by the availability of income per capita data; (iii) a single continent dummy is used to
represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (iv) robust standard
error estimates are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Figure C.1: Impact of Land Suitability on Population Density in the Year 1000
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Table C.10: Impact of Land Suitability on Population Density in the Year 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var.: Log Population Density in the Year 1
Log Land Suitability 0.448*** 0.281*** 0.342*** 0.330***
(0.102) (0.101) (0.0797) (0.0785)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.124 0.280** 0.238*
(0.173) (0.139) (0.130)
Log Average Elevation 0.0286 -0.263* -0.252**
(0.153) (0.135) (0.120)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.0952 0.0276 -0.0186
(0.196) (0.136) (0.137)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.760*** -0.635*** -0.603***
(0.264) (0.197) (0.191)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.519 0.322 0.343
(0.486) (0.404) (0.399)
Log Years Since Neolithic 2.068*** 1.767***
(0.298) (0.314)
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1 -0.203***
(0.0607)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 129 129 129 129
R-squared 0.460 0.705 0.558 0.723
Summary: This table establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of land suitability on
population density in the year 1, while controlling for average ruggedness, average
elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year 1, and xed
e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and
the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability
for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) the set of continent dummies in Columns
(1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia and Europe. An Oceania dummy is
not included due to a single observation for this continent in the corresponding regression samples,
restricted by the availability of income per capita data; (iii) a single continent dummy is used to
represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (iv) robust standard
error estimates are reported in parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Figure C.2: Impact of Land Productivity on Population Density in the Year 1
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Table C.12
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Pop. Dens. Log Pop. Dens. Log Pop. Dens. Irrigation
in 1500 in 1000 in 1 in 1900
Log Land Suitability 0.483*** 0.439*** 0.351*** -0.386***
(0.0567) (0.0637) (0.0872) (0.116)
Log Adjusted Land Gini 0.244* 0.116 0.0782 0.373
(0.135) (0.129) (0.129) (0.384)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.284*** 0.293** 0.250* 0.587
(0.109) (0.121) (0.130) (0.353)
Log Average Elevation -0.203** -0.251** -0.267** 0.232
(0.0974) (0.116) (0.119) (0.386)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.368** -0.329** -0.0172 0.113
(0.145) (0.159) (0.138) (0.208)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.439** -0.421** -0.624*** -0.531
(0.174) (0.201) (0.194) (0.446)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River 0.929*** 0.562 0.387 2.618**
(0.335) (0.406) (0.399) (1.071)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.868*** 1.143*** 1.754*** 0.499
(0.219) (0.260) (0.312) (0.723)
Distance to Frontier in 1500 -0.192*** -0.207*** -0.206*** -0.164*
(0.0398) (0.0761) (0.0589) (0.0916)
Continental-Landlocked-Island Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 142 129 72
R-squared 0.758 0.689 0.723 0.702
Summary This tab le estab lishes the sign icant p ositive e¤ect of land su itab ility on population density in the years 1500, 1000
and 1 as well as the adverse e¤ect of land su itab ility on the fraction of irrigated land , while contro lling for land inequality,
average ruggedness, average elevation , absolute latitude, access to navigab le waterways, years since the Neolith ic transition , d istance
from the nearest technologica l frontier and xed e¤ects for land lo cked country, island , and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land su itab ility is a geospatia l index of the su itab ility of land for agricu lture based on ecologica l ind icators of clim ate su itab ility for
cu ltivation , such as grow ing degree days and the ratio of actual to p otentia l evap otransp iration , as well as ecologica l ind icators of so il su itab ility for cu ltivation ,
such as so il carb on density and soil pH ; (ii) land inequality is the G in i co e¢ cient based on the d istribution of a land su itab ility index, rep orted at a half-degree
reso lution by Ramankutty et al. (2002), across grid cells w ith in a country ; (iii) The regression on irrigation excludes countries that were not a m ember of the
OECD in 1985, in an attempt to exclude the countries that had already industria lized in 1900; (iv) data on irrigation are rep orted by Freydank and Sieb ert
(2008), who have constructed a set of annual values of area equ ipp ed for irrigation for a ll 236 countries during the tim e p eriod 1900 - 2003. The irrigation
variab le is using the data for the year 1900 CE and is expressed as a ratio of irrigated land over arab le land; (v) the set of continent dumm ies in Columns (1)-(4)
includes a xed e¤ect for A frica , the Americas, Australia and Europ e. An Ocean ia dummy is not included due to a single observation for th is continent in the
corresp onding regression samples, restricted by the availab ility of incom e p er cap ita data; (v i) a single continent dummy is used to represent the Americas, which
in natural g iven the h istorica l p eriod exam ined ; (v ii) robust standard error estim ates are rep orted in parentheses; (v iii) *** denotes statistica l sign icance at the
1 p ercent level, ** at the 5 p ercent level, and * at the 10 p ercent level, a ll for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.13
(1) (2)
Log Per Capita GDP in 2000 Trust
Log Adjusted Land Suitability -0.260** -0.0467*
(0.101) (0.0252)
Log Adjusted Land Gini 0.00907 0.0659
(0.167) (0.0505)
Log Average Ruggedness -0.0000139 -0.0239
(0.127) (0.0406)
Log Average Elevation -0.142 -0.00231
(0.148) (0.0495)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.0247 0.0979**
(0.159) (0.0410)
Mean Distance to Nearest Coast or River -0.226 -0.0478
(0.193) (0.0504)
% of Land within 100 km of Coast or River -0.218 0.0359
(0.379) (0.0908)
Log Adj. Years Since Neolithic 0.0316 0.232**
(0.310) (0.0995)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.526 0.0399
(0.389) (0.117)
Polity IV 0.0623** -0.0184**
(0.0301) (0.00828)
% of Pop at Risk of Malaria -1.137** 0.194
(0.486) (0.127)
Continental-Landlocked-Island Dummies Yes Yes
Legal Origin - European Colony Dummies Yes Yes
Major Religion Shares Yes Yes
Observations 107 57
R-squared 0.840 0.801
Summary: This tab le estab lishes the sign icant adverse e¤ect of ad justed land su itab ility on incom e p er cap ita in year 2000
and on the level o f generalized trust, while contro lling for average ruggedness, average elevation , absolute latitude, access
to navigab le waterways, ad justed years since the Neolith ic transition , ethn ic fractionalization , quality of institutions, d isease
environm ent, and xed e¤ects for land lo cked country, island , legal orig in , Europ ean colony, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Data on trust com e from ve di¤erent waves of the WVS (1981-2008); (ii) log land su itab ility is a geospatia l index of the su itab ility of land
for agricu lture based on ecologica l ind icators of clim ate and soil su itab ility for cu ltivation ; (iii) land inequality is the G in i co e¢ cient based on the d istribution of
a land su itab ility index; (iv) Adj. land su it. and adj. land inequality is using the m igration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010);. (v) the set of continental
dumm ies includes a xed e¤ect for A frica , Austra lia , Europ e, N . America , S . America and Ocean ia ; (v i) legal orig ins dumm ies includes a xed e¤ect for B ritish ,
French , G erman, Scandinavian and Socia list orig in ; (v i) m a jor relig ion shares dumm ies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic , Muslim Protestant and other relig ious
shares; (v ii) Europ ean colony dumm ies include a xed e¤ect for British , French , Portuguese, Spanish and other Europ ean colony; (v iii) robust standard error
estim ates are rep orted in parentheses; (ix) *** denotes statistica l sign icance at the 1 % ** at the 5% , and * at the 10% , all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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